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Kentucky's Doctrine of
Advancements: A Time for Reform*
BY CAROLYN S. BRATT**
INTRODUCTION
The act of giving a gift is accomplished so easily that the
legal consequences often escape the donor. Even when a donor
stops to contemplate the legal significance of her or his act, a
parental donor probably is unaware that a gift to a child may
affect the child's inheritance rights in the parent's estate. Ken-
tucky is among the minority of states which continue to presume
that a parental gift is intended as an advancement to the child
donee.' Moreover, Kentucky is one of only two states which
make the presumption irrebutable. 2 The value of the gift is
charged against the child's share of the parent's intestate estate
even if the parent expressly states a contrary intention.3
* Sections of this article are reproduced from a manuscript comprising a part of
the forthcoming Kentucky Wills and Intestacy Law, with permission of the publisher
and copyright holder, Banks-Baldwin Law Publishing Company, Cleveland, Ohio.
** 1986 W.L. Matthews Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. The author
gives special recognition to Karen Greenwell, J.D., 1985, University of Kentucky for her
editorial suggestions and to Robert Stevenson, second year law student, University of
Kentucky, for his research.
I The states are: Georgia (GA. CODE AN. § 53-4-50 (1981)), Kansas (KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 59-510 (1983)), Louisiana (LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1227 (West 1952)), Missis-
sippi (Miss. CODE ANN. § 91-1-17 (1972)), Pennsylvania (PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2109
(Purdon 1975)), South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-3-60 (Law. Co-op. 1976)),
Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-5-102 (1984)), Virginia (VA. CODE § 64.1-17 (1980)),
and West Virginia (W. VA. CODE § 42-4-1 (1982)).
2 The other state is South Carolina. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-3-60.
KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 391.140 (Baldwin 1984) [hereinafter KRS] provides:
(1) Any real or personal property or money, given or devised by a
parent or grandparent to a descendant, shall be charged to the descendant
or those claiming through him in the division and distribution of the
undevised estate of the parent or grandparent. The person to whom the
property or money was given or devised shall receive nothing further from
the estate until the shares of the other descendants are made proportionately
equal with his, according to his descendable and distributable share of the
whole estate, real and personal, devised and undevised. The advancement
shall be estimated according to the value of the property when given. The
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Kentucky's highest court has recognized that although appli-
cation of Kentucky's advancement doctrine may work an injus-
tice, the fault lies with the advancement statute and not with the
court's interpretation and application of that statute. 4 Because
Kentucky's highest court has indicated its unwillingness to re-
consider its interpretation and application of the advancement
statute to a parental decedent's intestate property and because
the statute as presently construed can cause unexpected, unin-
tended and unfair results due to the public's lack of familiarity
with the advancement concept, the time to reform Kentucky's
advancement statute has come.
This article begins with a short historical overview of the
advancement concept. The overview is followed by an in-depth
analysis of Kentucky's advancement caselaw. Finally, the author
proposes remedial legislation to correct the problems with Ken-
tucky's current advancement statute.
1. HISTORY AND. GENERAL NATURE OF KENTUCKY'S DOCTRINE
OF ADVANCEMENTS
The prototype for contemporary advancement legislation in
this country was the English Statute of Distribution.5 Blackstone
identified the Roman law doctrine of collatio bonorum6 as well
as the ancient customs of London, York, and Scotland as pos-
sible sources of the advancement concept found in the Statute
of Distribution.7 The Statute of Distribution provided for the
equalization of intestate shares taken by the decedent's children
maintaining or educating or the giving of money, to a child or grandchild
without any view to a portion or settlement in life, shall not be deemed
an advancement.
(2) Advancements made to distributees shall not be taken as a part
of the decedent's personal estate in estimating the distributable share of
the widow or widower in the estate.
See, e.g., Remmele v. Kinstler, 298 S.W.2d. 680, 683 (Ky. 1957).
22 & 23 Car. 2, ch. 10, § V (1670).
6 Under this doctrine, emancipated children who received a dowry were permitted
to claim a child's share in the estate of their father. Before taking a child's share,
however, an emancipated son had to account for all property he had accumulated and
a daughter was required to account for the value of her dowry. Elbert, Advancements:
1, 51 MicH. L. REv. 665, 666-67 (1953).
1I CoouEY's BLAcKsToNE 517 (1872).
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when some of those children had received intervivos gifts of
land or personalty from their parent in anticipation of the amount
to which they would be entitled as one of the parent's intestate
takers. 8 Regardless of the precise source of the advancement
concept, the American laws on advancements are purely statu-
tory. 9
A typical statute defines an advancement as an intervivos
gift by a parent to a child intended by the donor as an antici-
pation of the donee's intestate share of the donor's estate.10
Absent directions from the testator, the doctrine is not applicable
when the donor dies wholly testate.11 In most jurisdictions, the
advancement concept does not apply to estates of donors who
die only partially intestate.'
2
Kentucky's advancement statute departs from the typical
statute in a number of ways. The statute does not limit advance-
ments merely to gifts by a parent to a child but also includes
gifts of real or personal property from a grandparent to a
descendant. 3
If the donor dies totally testate, Kentucky follows the ma-
jority rule that the advancement doctrine is not applicable unless
the testator affirmatively provided in the will that the doctrine
should apply.1 4 Kentucky's advancement statute expressly man-
dates its application when the decedent dies partially testate15 by
providing that property "given or devised by a parent or grand-
' The statute requires that:
[N]o child of the intestate (except his heir-at-law) on whom he settled in
his lifetime any estate in lands, or pecuniary portion, equal to the distrib-
utive shares of the other children, shall have any part of the surplusage
with their brothers and sisters; but, if the estates so given them, by way
of advancement, are not quite equivalent to the other shares, the children
so advanced shall now have so much as will make them equal. Id.
9 6 W. BoviE & D. PARKER, PAGE ON Tim LAw oF WIns § 55.1, at 301 (1962).
'I Id.
T. ATKLISON, HANDBOOK OF Tnm LAW OF WIL s 723 (2d ed. 1953).
2 d. at 724.
13 KRS § 391.140(1) (Baldwin 1984).
11 Sandidge v. Kentucky Trust Co, 402 S.W.2d 105, 107 (Ky. 1966); McPherson
v. Black, 284 S.W. 413, 415 (Ky. 1926); Jones v. Jones' Ex'rs, 250 S.W. 92, 94 (Ky.
1923); Melton v. Sellars, 181 S.W. 346, 347 (Ky. 1916); Gulley v. Lillard's Ex'r, 141
S.W. 5S, 59 (Ky. 1911).
" Stiff's Ex'r v. Stiff, 290 S.W. 718, 719 (Ky. 1927); 250 S.W. at 94; Owsley v.
Owsley, 77 S.W. 394, 397 (Ky. 1903).
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parent to a descendant, shall be charged to the descendant...
in the division and distribution of the undevised estate." ' 16 For
example, in the case of partial testacy, an intestate taker who
received a will gift is charged with an advancement equal to the
value of the will gift when the decedent's intestate property is
distributed.
The decedent in Walters v. Neafus17 died partially testate.
The will provided for one of the decedent's intestate takers but
expressly excluded any portion for another. Not only did the
excluded intestate taker share in the undevised property, but the
intestate taker who was provided for in the will was charged
with an advancement equal to the value of the will gift. 8
Until the moment of death, a parent or grandparent who
has made an intervivos gift to a descendant has the power to
prevent application of the advancement statute by disposing of
all her or his property by will. Thus, property given to a donee
is not technically an advancement as long as the donor is alive. 19
As with any gift, the donee must accept an advancement
before the gift is complete. Usually acceptance can be presumed.
If the donee does not accept the proffered gift, however, the
gift cannot be charged against the donee as an advancement.
20
In one case, 2' prior to death, the parent moved a piano into the
home of one of the parent's children. The child tendered the
piano to the parent's estate after the parent died and disclaimed
any title to it. Because the child never accepted the piano as a
gift, its value was not counted as an advancement against the
child's share in the distribution of the parent's intestate estate.'2
In ascertaining which transfers constitute advancements, the
majority rule is that an advancement is any gift which the donor
6 KRS § 391.140(1) (emphasis added).
, 125 S.W. 167 (Ky. 1910).
'8 Id. at 170.
" 77 S.W. at 396. Cf. Stevenson v. Martin, 74 Ky. (11 Bush) 485, 493 (1875)
(gifts by grandparent to grandchild while parent is still alive are mere gratuities at the
time they are made and are chargeable neither to the grandchild nor the parents and
subsequent death of the parent during the lifetime of the grandparent does not change
the gifts' legal character).
10 Isgrigg v. Isgrigg, 200 S.W. 478, 480 (Ky. 1918).
21 Oliver v. Crewdson's Adm'r, 77 S.W.2d 20 (Ky. 1934).
2 Id. at 22.
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intends to be charged against the donee in the distribution of
the donor's intestate estate. 23 In Kentucky, however, since 1852,
the donor's intent regarding whether a transfer should be charge-
able against the donee's intestate share is irrelevant in determin-
ing whether the transfer constitutes an advancement. 24 The
principle of Kentucky's advancement statute is strict financial
equality among all of the decedent's intestate takers in the dis-
tribution of the undevised property of the decedent.25 If a parent
dies totally or partially intestate and some of the children re-
ceived intervivos or testamentary gifts from the deceased parent,
there have been statutory advancements. The donor's intestate
property will be used to equalize the unfavored and favored
children as far as possible by prohibiting the favored children
from sharing in the decedent's intestate property unless, and
until, the unfavored children are first made their financial equals.
26
Even if the donor clearly expressed the intention that the
donee should not be charged with an advancement, the donee
will still be charged if the gift is a gratuitous transfer falling
within the statutory definition of an advancement. 27 If, however,
the transfer to an intestate taker was made for valuable consid-
eration, it is not chargeable as an advancement because it is a
sale not a gift.? The real nature of the transaction controls
rather than the donor's intention no matter how clearly one can
show that the donor did not intend the transaction to result in
an advancement to the donee. 29
In Ecton v. Flynn,30 a father conveyed land to three of his
five children. The deed expressly provided that the conveyance
was "not in the nature of an advancement," but was an "ab-
1- T. ATKINSON, supra note 11, at 718.
14 Bowles v. Winchester, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 1, 11 (1877).
2 Popplewell v. Flanagan, 244 S.W.2d 445, 450 (Ky. 1951); Gossage v. Gossage's
Adm'r, 136 S.W.2d 775, 777 (Ky. 1940); Weddle v. Waddle's Adm'r, 87 S.W.2d 383,
384 (Ky. 1935); Erdman's Adm'r v. Erdman's Ex'r and Trustee, 16 S.W.2d 756, 757
(Ky. 1929).
'6 Ecton v. Flynn, 17 S.W.2d 407, 410 (Ky. 1929).
2 See note 3 supra. Thomas v. Thomas, 398 S.W.2d 231, 232 (Ky. 1965); Farmers'
Exch. Bank of Millersburg v. Moffett, 75 S.W.2d 1063, 1065 (Ky. 1934); Day v. Grubbs,
32 S.W.2d 327, 329 (Ky. 1930); McCray v. Corn, 182 S.W. 640, 643 (Ky. 1916).
32 S.W.2d at 329-30.
136 S.W.2d at 777; 200 S.W. at 479.
17 S.W.2d 407 (Ky. 1929).
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solute gift" to the donees. 31 Because the consideration for the
conveyance was love and affection, not valuable consideration,
32
the conveyance was a gift rather than a sale. Therefore, the
donees were charged with advancements because the statute pro-
vides that any property given by a parent to a child is an
advancement. The result reached by the court was obviously
unfair. 33 The donor's only option was to die totally testate and
thereby avoid the operation of the statute.
34
A donor's unilateral intention to make a transaction that is
not under the statute into an advancement is also ineffectual.
35
The advancement statute provides that a gift made to a descen-
dant is chargeable only to the actual donee or to those claiming
a share of the decedent's intestate estate through the donee.
36
When a decedent gives a gift to a grandchild, the gift is not
charged against the grandchild's parent's share of the decedent's
estate37 because the grandchild's parent did not actually receive
the gift and does not claim an intestate share in the donor's
estate through the grandchild. Even if the donor intended the
gift to the grandchild to be considered an advancement to the
parent, it cannot be charged to the parent unless the donee's
parent consented that the gift be made directly to the grandchild
on the parent's account.
3 1
Some Kentucky advancement cases refer to the donor's in-
tention, appearing to contradict the rule that the advancement
statute, not the intention of the donor, regulates the question of
advancements. These cases do not, however, contradict the rule.
Many of these cases deal with the advancement concept in the
context of will interpretation. By an affirmative will provision,
when will beneficiaries have received intervivos gifts from the
testator, the testator may adopt the advancements doctrine to
equalize distribution among the beneficiaries. 39 The polestar of
1, Id. at 409.
32 Id. at 411.
1 Remmele v. Kinstler, 298 S.W.2d 680, 683 (Ky. 1957).
34 See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
31 Talbott's Ex'r v. Goetz, 151 S.W.2d 369, 371 (Ky. 1941).
36 KRS § 391.140(1).
31 87 S.W.2d at 383.
31 Id. at 384.
39 250 S.W. at 94.
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will interpretation, however, is the intention of the testator, and
any such provision must be interpreted in light of such intention.
If the testator provided that certain will beneficiaries are to be
charged with advancements against their will shares, the testa-
tor's intention controls even if the particular transaction would
not have been an advancement in intestacy under the advance-
ment statute.
The testator in Duff v. Duffs Ex'ri 0 devised land to his
son's children. Under the advancement statute the transfer would
not have been an advancement to the son in intestacy unless the
son had consented to be charged. 41 The will's provisions, how-
ever, demonstrated to the court's satisfaction that the testator
intended to treat the conveyance as an advancement to the son,
and the son was so charged. 42 Unlike a person who dies intestate,
a testator, with the intention to do so, can make an advancement
of a gift that would not be one under the advancement statute.
Other seemingly conflicting cases discuss the donor's inten-
tion in relation to the issue of what was given to the donee.
They do not, however, consider the donor's intention in deter-
mining whether the thing given is characterized properly as an
advancement. In Isgrigg v. Isgrigg43 evidence of the donor's
intention was admitted to determine whether the donor intended
to give the donee ownership or merely the use and occupation
of disputed land.44 In another case, Combs' Adm'r v. Morgan,45
the decedent's intention was relevant in determining whether the
decedent's son had taken title to certain land as a $2000 ad-
vancement or subject to a $2000 lien in favor of the decedent's
estate.46
Some Kentucky cases refer to the majority, non-Kentucky
rule that the donor's intention is relevant to resolve the question
of whether there has been an advancement.47 A close reading of
11 142 S.W. 242 (Ky. 1912).
41 See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
,1 142 S.W. at 243.
4- 200 S.W. 478 (Ky. 1918).
- Id. at 479-80.
Is 281 S.W. 466 (Ky. 1926).
" Id. at 466.
4' See, e.g., Chism v. Chism, 176 S.W.2d 101, 103 (Ky. 1943); Thompson v.
Latimer, 273 S.W. 65, 66-67 (Ky. 1925).
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these cases reveals, however, that the language is unnecessary to
the holdings, and the actual results are consistent with Kentuc-
ky's advancement rules. For example, in Thompson v. Latimer,
48
the court held for the first time that the value of an insurance
policy originally payable to the donor's estate but later assigned
to the donee was an advancement. 49 Initially, the court made no
reference to the donor's intention. The court pointed out that
using the donor's funds to pay premiums on a life insurance
policy payable to the donee is no different in substance than
using the donor's money to buy stock for the donee.5 0 Both
transactions involve setting aside some of the donor's property
for the benefit of the donee - property which could have
accumulated in other forms and passed to all of the donor's
intestate takers upon death. The court pointed out that its treat-
ment of the insurance policy proceeds was in harmony with the
advancement statute's purpose of effecting equality of distribu-
tion.-' Only as an afterthought, no doubt to buttress its opinion,
the court stated that the donor clearly assigned the policy with
the intent that it be part of the donee's share of the estate .
2
When a donor dies partially or totally intestate, an advance-
ment given by the donor to a descendant affects the donee only
to the extent that the donee may not share further in the donor's
intestate estate until all other takers are made financially equal. 3
The donee, however, cannot be forced to give up any advance-
ments which exceed the value of the donee's intestate share.5 4
II. HOTCHPOT - THE METHOD OF COMPUTING AN
ADVANCEMENT
The hotchpot method is used to account for advancements
when a decedent dies totally or partially intestate. 5 The easiest
way to explain this method is with an example.
48 273 S.W. 65 (Ky. 1925).
48 Id. at 67.
0 Id. at 66.
"1 Id. at 67.
52 Id.
53 KRS § 391.140(1).
Edwards v. Livesay, 261 S.W. 839, 840 (Ky. 1924); Farley v. Stacey, 197 S.W.
636, 640 (Ky. 1917); Cornette v. McCoy, 140 S.W. 683, 684 (Ky. 1911).
11 Bowman's Adm'rs v. Bowman's Ex'r and Adm'r, 192 S.W.2d 955, 957 (Ky.
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DECEDENTI I
C1 C2 C3
[$50001 [$60001
GC1 GC2
[$3000]
FIGURE 1
Assume that the decedent D died intestate survived by two
children, C1 and C3, and two grandchildren, GC1 and GC2, the
children of child C2 who predeceased D. Prior to death and
while C2 was still alive, D gave $5000 to C1 and $6000 to C2.
After C2 died, D gave $3000 to GC2. The decedent's net intestate
estate was $16,000 after exemptions, debts, costs of administra-
tion and funeral expenses were deducted from D's gross estate.
The first step of the hotchpot method requires that all ad-
vancements made to intestate takers be brought into hotchpot.
Any donee who refuses to participate is not entitled to any other
share of the donor's estate. 6 The intestate takers who received
or are charged with advancements do not actually have to turn
the advancement over to the decedent's estate in specie.5 7 The
hotchpot is just a paper computation aimed at achieving equality
among the intestate takers. The decedent's net estate is theoret-
ically increased by the value of all advancements. This calcula-
tion produces a figure that represents the value of the decedent's
estate as if the decedent died owning the property given as
advancements.
If a spouse survived D, the spouse's share in D's intestate
estate is deducted from the estate before any advancements are
1946); Traughber v. King, 32 S.W.2d 8, 11 (Ky. 1930); Montgomery's Trustee v. Brown,
121 S.W. 472, 474 (Ky. 1909) (hotchpot computation in a wills context).
!, 192 S.W.2d at 957; Collins v. Collins' Adm'r, 45 S.W.2d 811, 815 (Ky. 1931);
Erdman's Adm'r v. Erdman's Ex'r and Trustee, 16 S.W.2d 756, 757 (Ky. 1929).
17 Damron v. Bartley, 194 S.W.2d 73, 75 (Ky. 1946).
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added.58 The advancements are added to the net estate because
by statute and caselaw, exemptions, costs of administration,
funeral expenses, and debts must be paid before there is any
distribution of the intestate estate.5 9 After adding the value of
the various advancements to the net estate, each intestate taker's
share in the theoretical estate is determined. All advancements
made or chargeable to each intestate taker are then subtracted
from each share.
In the example, the $5000 given to child C1, the $6000 given
to the predeceased child C2, and the $3000 given to the grand-
child GC1 are added to the net estate. The amount given to the
grandchild is includable because the advancement statute ex-
pressly treats gifts by a grandparent (D) to descendants (GCJ
and GC2) as advancements if the descendants are also intestate
takers of the donor 0 Because their parent, C2, predeceased D,
the grandchildren are intestate takers in place of their parent.6'
The amount given to C2 is included in the hotchpot because the
statute provides that any gift from a parent (D) to a descendant
(C2) is charged to those claiming through the descendant in the
division and distribution of the decedent's estate. 2 Both grand-
children are claiming an intestate share in D's estate through
their parent C2.
After adding all of the advancements to D's net estate
($16,000 + $5,000 + $6,000 + $3,000), the sum obtained
($30,000) is divided among the intestate takers according to their
statutorily determined intestate shares. In this example, the estate
is divided into three shares representing the two children who
," KRS § 391.140(2) (Baldwin 1984) (advancements shall not be taken as part of
the decedent's personal estate in estimating the distributable share of a surviving spouse).
11 International Harvester Co. v. Dyer's Adm'r, 178 S.W.2d 966 (Ky. 1944) (costs
of administration); KRS ch. 396 (Baldwin 1984) (claims against decedents' estates); KRS
§ 391.030(1) (Baldwin 1984) (personalty exemption); KRS § 396.090 (Baldwin 1984)
(funeral expenses); KRS § 427.060 (Baldwin 1984) (homestead exemption).
- KRS § 391.140(1) (Baldwin 1984). Cf. Owsley v Owsley, 77 S.W. 394 (Ky. 1903)
(property given to a donee is not technically an advancement as long as the donor is
alive). Contra Stevenson v. Martin, 74 Ky. (11 Bush) 485, 493 (1875) (gift to grandchild
during life of parent was not converted into an advancement to the grandchild by
subsequent death of the parent during the lifetime of the grandparent).
6- KRS §§ 391.010(1), 391.040 (Baldwin 1984).
62 Frye v. Avritt, 68 S.W. 420, 421 (Ky. 1902) (advancements to daughter charge-
able to her children); KRS § 391.140(1).
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survived D and the one child who left issue surviving D.63 C1
and C3 are each entitled to one-third of the estate, or $10,000,
while GC1 and GC2 share equally the one-third C2 would have
taken ($5000 each).
Any advancement received by, or chargeable to, an intestate
taker is then subtracted from that taker's share in hotchpot. C1
is entitled to receive only $5000, not $10,000, from the estate
because C1 received a $5000 advancement on that share ($10,000
- $5000 = $5000). Because C3 did not receive any advance-
ments, C3 is entitled to the full one-third share or $10,000
($10,000 - $0 = $10,000). The grandchildren are each charged
with half of all advancements received by their parent and for
any advancement they received individually. GC1 is entitled to
$2000 from the estate because GC1 did not receive any individual
advancements and is charged with half of C2's advancement
($5000 - [$6000 -- 2] = $2000). GC2 is not entitled to receive
anything because GC2 had advancements in excess of the intes-
tate share allotted to each grandchild. GC2 is charged with half
of C2's advancement and all of GC2's own advancement ($5000
- [$6000 2] - $3000 = -$1000). Grandchild GC2 drops out
of hotchpot but retains the property received as advancements.
64
GC2 cannot be compelled to refund any part of the advance-
ments to the decedent's estate because an advancement does not
constitute a debt owing from the donee to the donor's estate. 65
Even when a donee participates in a hotchpot in which the donee
received more as advancements than her or his rightful intestate
share, the donee need not forfeit any advancement.66 If litigation
arises concerning whether advancements were made, the alleged
donee may refuse to come into the hotchpot until the litigation
is resolved without forfeiting the right to thereafter participate. 67
In the above example, because GC2 does not refund any
advancements, the computation is done again, adding only the
,3 KRS § 391.040.
Pendley v. Lee, 25 S.W.2d 1030, 1032 (Ky. 1930).
" Farmers' Exch. Bank of Millersburg v. Moffett, 75 S.W.2d 1063, 1065 (Ky.
1934); Gibbs v. Gibbs, 72 S.W.2d 473, 474 (Ky. 1934); McPherson v. Black, 284 S.W.
413, 414-15 (Ky. 1926); Edwards v. Livesay, 261 S.W. 839, 840 (Ky. 1924).
Damron v. Bartley, 194 S.W.2d 73, 75 (Ky. 1946).
Cf. 261 S.W. at 840.
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advancements made to C1 and C2 to the decedent's net estate
($16,000 + $5,000 + $6,000 = $27,000). Grandchild GC1 is
now the only taker of the share C2 would have taken and is
charged with all of C2's advancement instead of only one-half.
The estate is still divided into three shares because two children
and issue of the predeceased child survived the decedent. Each
intestate taker should receive $9000 in value from the estate. C1
is entitled to only $4000 because C1 has already been given a
$5000 advancement ($9000 - $5000 = $4000). C3 did not
receive any advancements and is entitled to the full $9000. GC1
is entitled to only $3000 because all of C2's $6000 advancement
is charged against GCI's one-third of the intestate estate ($9000
- $6000 = $3000).
One should note that if C2 survived the decedent, C2 would
not be charged with the gift to GC2. Only gifts actually received
by the intestate taker or received by a donee through whom the
intestate taker claims a share in the donor's estate are charged
as advancements. 6 If C2 survived D, C2 did not actually receive
the gift given to GC2 and C2 is not claiming a share in D's
estate through GC2.
When an intestate taker is required to account for an ad-
vancement, the advancement is deducted from the taker's interest
in both personalty and realty inherited from the estate. 69 There
are no reported cases challenging the hotchpot method for
achieving equality among intestate takers.
III. OTHER TRANSACTIONS DIsTINGUSHED FROM
ADVANCEMENTS
Not all intervivos transfers of real or personal property by
a grandparent or parent to a descendant are advancements. The
transfer may create a debt or may be made pursuant to a bona
fide contract of sale. Neither creation of a debt nor sale of
property qualifies as an advancement. By definition an advance-
ment is a gratuitous transfer7 ° with no obligation in the donee
-' KRS § 391.140(1). See notes 36-38 supra and accompanying text.
69 Harlow v. Brand, 148 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Ky. 1941); Loverett v. Veatch, 105
S.W.2d 1052, 1057 (Ky. 1937).
10 KRS § 391.140(1) (Baldwin 1984).
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to repay the donor. 7' Because different legal consequences flow
from characterizing a transfer as an advancement, a sale, or a
debt, it is important to distinguish among them.
A. Sale
A parent and child may legally contract with each other for
the sale of property.72 The character of the consideration received
determines whether a transfer of property is a sale or an ad-
vancement. 73 If the decedent received valuable consideration for
the property, the transfer is a sale with no obligation on the
transferee to account for the property in the distribution of the
decedent's estate.
Valuable consideration can be in money or money's worth. 74
Because the transfer is in an intrafamily context, allowance for
the natural affection between parent and child is made in judging
the adequacy of the consideration. To support a finding that
there has been a sale, and not an advancement, the consideration
does not have to be the equivalent of the price a stranger would
be charged. 75 If the consideration is alleged to be past or future
services by the child for the benefit of the parent, the child must
show that at the time of the conveyance the parties intended
that the transfer was to be payment for those services. Showing
merely that the transferee rendered services that might have been
of sufficient value to serve as consideration for the transfer is
not sufficient.
76
Thomas v. Thomas" illustrates this rule. The court in Thomas
expressly found that two of three daughters rendered extraordi-
nary services to their mother for many years. 78 Nonetheless, the
71 Farmers' Exch. Bank of Millersburg v. Moffett, 75 S.W.2d 1063, 1065 (Ky.
1934); Gibbs v. Gibbs, 72 S.W.2d 473, 474 (Ky. 1934); McPherson v. Black, 284 S.W.
413, 414 (Ky. 1926).
Day v. Grubbs, 32 S.W.2d 327, 329-30 (Ky. 1930).
" Gossage v. Gossage's Adm'r, 136 S.W.2d 775, 777 (Ky. 1940).
,1 17 Aii. JuR. 2D Contracts § 95, at 438 (1964).
71 136 S.W.2d at 777. Cf. 32 S.W.2d at 330 (if consideration is grossly dispropor-
tionate, excess is an advancement).
71. Thomas v. Thomas, 398 S.W.2d 231, 232 (Ky. 1965); 32 S.W.2d at 330; Ecton
v. Flynn, 17 S.W.2d 407, 411 (Ky. 1929).
398 S.W.2d 231 (Ky 1965).
Id. at 232.
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appellate court determined that the conveyance of land to these
two daughters was an advancement because the conveyance was
made "in appreciation" for, rather than "in consideration" of,
the services. 79 The court found there was no meeting of the
minds between the mother and daughters of any price to be paid
for the services. Neither was there any indication whether the
transfer included an obligation to furnish continuing support to
the mother. The daughters never presented any claim for services
and did not execute any release to the mother against their
unpresented claims. 80
Other cases81 have reached the same result when the child
provided services out of filial devotion without an expectation
of compensation, and because of those services the parent made
a gift to the child. The child failed to demonstrate that the
transfer was intended as payment for the services rendered.
This rule penalizes children who gratuitously fulfill their filial
duties because they are charged with an advancement. Only a
child who expressly conditions providing services to a parent
upon receipt of compensation can be assured that the services
will be treated as valuable consideration sufficient to support a
finding that the transfer was a sale. Only one Kentucky case
sustains a property transfer from a parent to a child as a sale
in exchange for services rendered. 82 That case involved an express
recital in the deed that the transfer was in consideration of the
care that the transferee gave and would give to the transferor
during the transferor's natural lifetime. 83
In Ecton v. Flynn,84 the deed of land from a father to his
sons recited the consideration as the "love and affection" the
father had for his sons. 85 Such consideration, if true, mandates
a finding that the transfer was an advancement. In Crafton v.
Inge,86 the deed from a father to his daughter and her husband
11 Id. at 233.
90 Id.
, Remmele v. Kinstler, 298 S.W.2d 680, 682 (Ky. 1957); 17 S.W.2d at 411-12.
32 32 S.W.2d at 330.
8' Id. at 329.
4 17 S.W.2d 407.
SS Id. at 409.
96 98 S.W. 325 (Ky. 1906).
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recited consideration of a sum of money.87 The payment of
money in exchange for a conveyance of land, if actually paid,
requires a finding of a sale. In Ecton, the deed recital was found
to be true and the transfer was treated as an advancement. 8 In
Crafton, the challengers successfully proved that despite the
recitation of monetary consideration in the deed, the conveyance
was not a sale, but an advancement. 89 Challenges to the cor-
rectness of a deed recitation of consideration are permitted be-
cause a grandparent or parent cannot, by a mere declaration,
exempt a descendant from being charged with an advancement
if the transfer is actually gratuitous and thus an advancement. 90
Nor can a parent or grandparent unilaterally change a non-
advancement transfer into an advancement. 91
The burden of proof in a challenge to the accuracy of a
deed recital of consideration rests on the party attacking the
recital's validity. 92 The challenger may meet that burden without
pleading that the recital was fraudulent or inserted by mistake,
93
but must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the con-
sideration was not as recited in the deed. 94 A recital of consid-
eration may be impeached by declarations, including oral
statements, of the parent or grandparent made before or con-
temporaneously with the deed stating whether the conveyance
was in response to the consideration recited. 95 Evidence of the
circumstances surrounding the conveyance is also competent for
impeaching the recital. 96 Declarations by the decedent subsequent
to the conveyance, however, are only competent if part of res
gestae or against the interest of the donor.
97
Although testimony concerning what the parent or grand-
parent said about the actual consideration for the transfer is
. Id.
17 S.W.2d at 412.
98 S.W.2d at 326.
A See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
"' See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
Z 32 S.W.2d at 329.
-0 Id.
" 17 S.W.2d at 411.
1 Id. at 412; McCray v. Corn, 182 S.W. 640, 643 (Ky. 1918); Bailey's Adm'rs v.
Barclay, 60 S.W. 377, 378 (Ky. 1901).
,1, 32 S.W.2d at 329-30; 17 S.W.2d at 411; 182 S.W. at 643.
57 32 S.W.2d at 329; 60 S.W. at 378.
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competent for impeaching the deed recital, it may be inadmis-
sible under Kentucky's Dead Man's statute. 98 The Dead Man's
statute prohibits people from testifying for themselves concern-
ing any verbal statement by, any transaction with, or any act
done or not done by a person who is dead. 99 Thus, parties
seeking to impeach the recital of consideration in a deed cannot
testify about conversations they had with the decedent in which
the decedent contradicted the consideration recited in the deed.
Exceptions do exist to the Dead Man's statute prohibitions.
For example, if the testimony is offered against a party who
also heard the decedent's statement or was present when the
transaction took place, it is admissible. 100 Another exception
arises when testimony concerning statements by or transactions
with the decedent is given by an interested witness without
objection. 10 The other party may then refute this testimony by
testifying about other statements by or transactions with the
decedent.02
In Crafton,0 3 the deed recited that money had been paid for
the conveyance. All of the parties agreed that the stated consid-
eration was never actually paid to the decedent. The grantee
son-in-law contended that he and the decedent agreed that the
land was to be transferred in consideration of the services the
son-in-law provided and the proceeds the decedent received from
the land the son-in-law worked for the two years immediately
prior to the conveyance. The opposing parties contended that
the transfer was an advancement. They introduced the decedent's
widow's testimony that the decedent told her the transfer was
an advancement.104
The opposing parties also established circumstances indica-
tive of an advancement rather than a sale. For instance, the
KRS § 421.210(2) (Baldwin 1984).
Id. Cf. Edwards v. Livesay, 261 S.W. 839, 841 (Ky. 1924) (parties cannot testify
for themselves about any act or declaration of the decedent, but a party is competent
to testify about any act or declaration of the decedent for any other party); Nichols v
King, 68 S.W. 133, 133 (Ky. 1902) (father executed separate deeds to his wife and several
sons-each grantee was competent to testify about delivery of deeds to other grantees).
'0 National Life Co. v. Rigney, 180 S.W.2d 847, 849 (Ky. 1944).
10 Combs v. Roark, 267 S.W. 210, 213 (Ky. 1924).
1o2 Id.
10, 98 S.W. 325.
1°4 Id. at 325-26.
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value of the services supposedly rendered and the proceeds from
the land for the two-year period were no more than what the
father would have received if he had worked the land himself.
The transferor was able-bodied and capable of caring for himself
and the land. The deed was not recorded until after the father's
death. The son-in-law was impecunious when he married the
daughter, and the father was very concerned about the marriage.
The land transfer followed closely after the marriage. The son-
in-law's own testimony was the only evidence that supported his
contention. 05
The court held the evidence offered by the son-in-law inad-
missible because it was testimony by an interested party about
a statement of the decedent and did not fit within any of the
exceptions to the Dead Man's statute. Because no one else was
present when the conversation between the decedent and his son-
in-law allegedly took place, the son-in-law's testimony was not
offered against a party who had heard the statement, too. The
son-in-law's testimony was inadmissible even to rebut the wid-
ow's testimony that the decedent told her the conveyance was
an advancement because the widow was not an interested party
in the controversy.'0 Her property rights in the estate were the
same whether the decedent sold the land or gave it as an ad-
vancement. The express terms of the advancement statute pro-
vided that advancements made to distributees are not taken in
account in determining the distributable share of the surviving
spouse. 0 7 Because no competent evidence of a bona fide sale
existed, the Crafton court held that the transfer was an advance-
ment. The daughter had to account for its value before she could
share any further in the decedent's estate. 08
Finally, there are cases that do not involve an alleged sale
of land by a parent or grandparent to a descendant, but instead
involve the purported release, or sale, of an intestate taker's
expectant share of the ancestor's estate in exchange for consid-
IA Id.
Id. at 326.
KRS § 391.140(2).
98 S.W. at 326.
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eration from the ancestor. 1 9 For example, in Pendley v. Lee,"0
a daughter expressly accepted a conveyance of land from her
father and mother as her full share in their estate."' This pur-
ported release of her expectancy was ineffectual" 2 because Ken-
tucky, unlike the majority of states, does not permit a contract
of release to be valid even if the intestate taker receives fair
consideration." 3 Although the contract of release is invalid, the
intestate taker is not forced to return the consideration to the
decedent's estate. The consideration is treated as an advancement
to the intestate taker," 4 and is chargeable against any intestate
share in the ancestor's estate to which the taker may be entitled.
B. Debt
Many Kentucky cases involve the question of whether the
transfer of property by a parent or grandparent to a descendant
constituted an advancement or created a debt owed by the des-
cendant to the estate of the ancestor. In a few cases the property
transfer was the ancestor's payment of a debt owed to the
descendant." 5 Because the transactions are not gratuitous, the
satisfaction or creation of binding legal obligations are not ad-
vancements.
In Corbin's Ex'rs v. Corbin,"6 the executors of the deceased
mother's estate claimed that money the mother paid to her
daughter was an advancement. For ten years during the daugh-
ter's minority, the mother used land inherited by the daughter
to pasture animals and grow crops without the daughter receiving
109 Weddington v. Adkins, 54 S.W.2d 331 (Ky. 1932); Pendley v. Lee, 25 S.W.2d
1030 (Ky. 1930); Elliot v. Leslie, 99 S.W. 619 (Ky. 1907).
,,0 25 S.W.2d 1030 (Ky. 1930).
Id.
232 Id. at 1032.
"' Prater v Hicks, 220 S.W.2d 1011, 1012 (Ky. 1949); Snyder v. Snyder, 235 S.W.
743, 744 (Ky. 1921); Hunt v. Smith, 230 S.W. 936, 938 (Ky. 1921); Burton v. Campbell,
195 S.W. 1091, 1092 (Ky. 1917); McCall's Adm'r v. Hampton, 32 S.W. 406, 407 (Ky.
1895); Wheeler's Ex'rs v. Wheeler, 59 Ky. (2 Met.) 474, 477 (1859); Beard v. Griggs, 24
Ky. (1 J.J. Marsh.) 22, 26 (1829).
114 54 S.W.2d at 332; 25 S.W.2d at 1032; 99 S.W. at 622.
"I Corbin's Ex'rs v. Corbin, 194 S.W.2d 65 (Ky. 1946); Schweitzer v. Schweitzer,
82 S.W. 625 (Ky. 1904).
.6 194 S.W.2d 65 (Ky. 1946).
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any income. The money the mother paid the daughter was found
to be compensation for this use of the land. The case is instruc-
tive because the court treated the money transfer as satisfaction
of a legal obligation the mother owed the daughter even though
there was no formal or informal agreement between the mother
and daughter requiring the mother to compensate her daughter
for the use of the land." 7 Because the court characterized the
transaction as the payment of a debt, and not as an advance-
ment, the daughter was not accountable for the money when the
mother's intestate estate was distributed.
The burden of proving that a grandparent or parent actually
transferred property to a descendant is on the party claiming
that a transfer occurred."' Once the transfer is established or
admitted, certain presumptions assist in determining the trans-
fer's character. For example, an unexplained transfer of property
by a grandparent or parent to a descendant is presumed to be a
gift chargeable as an advancement and not a loan." 9 A transfer
accompanied by the normal incidents of a loan, such as a note
and payment of interest, however, is presumed to be a debt and
not an advancement. 20 In the latter situation, the burden is on
the party claiming the transaction was an advancement.1
2 '
In Gibbs v. Gibbs, 22 the presumption arose that the transfers
of money from the father to his son created a debt because the
transfers were accompanied by interest bearing notes. The only
evidence that the transactions were actually advancements was
that the son was not a good financial risk and the father never
attempted to collect the notes. The court held that the transfer
was a valid debt, because it believed that the father's behavior
was explainable as parental concern for the child's financial
condition, a concern not inconsistent with making a loan.13
" Id. at 66.
,I Chism v. Chism, 176 S.W.2d 101, 103 (Ky. 1943). See also, Bailey's Adm'rs v.
Barclay, 60 S.W. 377 (Ky. 1901) (declarations made by parent or grandparent subsequent
to alleged transaction fail to meet burden).
" Stiff's Ex'r v. Stiff, 290 S.W. 718, 719 (Ky. 1927).
m 75 S.W.2d at 1065; 72 S.W.2d at 474.
2 75 S.W.2d at 1065; 72 S.W.2d at 474. Cf. 32 S.W.2d at 329 (burden of proof
on party seeking to impeach the deed recitation of consideration); 182 S.W. at 643.
122 72 S.W.2d 473 (Ky. 1934).
,13 Id. at 473-74.
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The father conveyed real property to one of his sons in
Proctor v. Proctor.-4 The son claimed the transaction was a
genuine, completed sale and introduced the note for the purchase
price. Ordinarily, a strong presumption of payment arises when
the alleged debtor possesses a note evidencing the indebtedness.
The presumption was very weak in this case, however, because
the son lived in his father's home at the time of the father's
death and had access to everything in the house. The court
characterized other evidence of payment as too vague and un-
satisfactory to warrant reversal of the determination that the
conveyance was an advancement and not a bona fide installment
sale. 1
25
Another case in which a transaction was characterized as an
advancement and not a debt despite the presence of a note was
Boblett v. Barlow.2 6 The transfer of money by a father to his
son was evidenced by the son's note, but the court concluded
that the note was without consideration because evidence clearly
demonstrated that the father intended from the outset to give
the money to his son. The father declared to a disinterested
witness that he was giving the money to keep the son equal with
a daughter who had the use of the father's land without charge
for more than twenty years. A deposition the father gave in a
lawsuit by the son's creditors also established that the money
was really an advancement and the note was only an afterthought
with no legal significance. 127
A descendant has no liability to repay the ancestor's estate
for advancement which exceeds the descendant's rightful share
of the decedent's intestate estate. An intestate taker only must
account for an advancement when the advancement is less than
the intestate taker's share and the intestate taker wants to share
further in the distribution of the decedent's estate.
12
The consequences of a debt, however, are very different. A
right of retainer exists when any intestate taker owes a debt to
'2 137 S.W.2d 354 (Ky. 1940).
' Id. at 356-57.
' 83 S.W. 145 (Ky. 1904).
'2 Id. at 145-46.
"I See notes 65-67 supra and accompanying text.
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the decedent. The estate is permitted to set off any debt legally
owing to the decedent against the share of any intestate taker
so indebted.1 29 Unlike an advancement, if the debt exceeds the
intestate taker's share of the estate, the intestate taker is liable
to the estate for the difference. 130
Because of this liability, it is usually better for the intestate
taker if the transaction with the decedent is characterized as an
advancement and not as a debt. This is not always true, however.
If collection of the debt owed by the intestate taker is barred by
a statute of limitations, the intestate taker is better off if the
transaction is treated as a debt. In Kentucky, contrary to the
majority rule 13 the personal representative may not set off a
debt time-barred by the relevant statute of limitations. 132 If the
property transferred was an advancement, the transferee would
be charged in the estate's distribution regardless of when the
transfer occurred.
33
A child of the decedent in Oliver v. Crewdson's Adm'r
34
pleaded a sister state's statute of limitation barring collection of
the debt as a defense to the set-off of the owed money. The
debt was evidenced by a note bearing interest. The note was
executed by the child in the sister state, delivered to a bank in
the sister state and was payable in that state. The decedent's
husband was the surety on the child's note and after his death,
the decedent paid the child's debt and acquired the note. The
court characterized the transaction as a debt the daughter owed
to her mother, the decedent. Although the debt was time-barred
in the sister state, the court applied Kentucky's longer statute of
limitation because it viewed statutes of limitations as affecting
the remedy only and not the right to recover. Because the note's
enforcement was not time-barred in Kentucky, the amount of
the note plus interest was set off against the daughter's intestate
share. 13S
"I Cf. Veatch's Adm'r v. Loverett, 97 S.W.2d 47, 48-49 (Ky. 1936).
75 S.W.2d at 1066.
," T. ATKINSON, supra note 11, at 789-90.
,2 Luscher v. Security Trust Co, 199 S.W. 613, 615 (Ky. 1918).
Id. at 613.
' 77 S.W.2d 20 (Ky. 1934). But see Payne v. Auxier, 277 S.W. 298 (Ky. 1925)
(payment of child's note by father who was the surety was an advancement, not a debt
subject to a statute of limitations).
M 77 S.W.2d at 21-22.
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Even though the initial transaction between a parent or
grandparent and a descendant may properly be characterized as
the creation of a debt, the debt may be changed into an ad-
vancement by mutual agreement. 136 For example, a parent who
is owed debts by a child can forgive those debts and release the
child from an obligation to re-pay any part of the debt.
137
Because the release is a gratuitous transfer, however, the value
of the debt forgiven must be accounted for as an advancement
if the child wishes to share in the intestate distribution of the
parent's estate. 138 On the other hand, even with the descendant's
agreement, a parent or grandparent cannot change a legal ad-
vancement into a debt. Because the statute defines an advance-
ment, any agreement purporting to change an advancement into
a debt is contrary to the terms of the statute and therefore
void. 13
9
IV. PROPERTY INTERESTS SUBJECT TO THE ADVANCEMENT
DOCTRINE
Any property interest may be the subject of an advancement.
It does not matter whether the property interest is real or per-
sonal, tangible or intangible, or whether it is a present or future
legal interest or an equitable one. 140 The most commonly litigated
advancements are gifts of land 4' followed closely by gifts of
136 75 S.W.2d at 1065.
'31 Gray v. Gray, 248 S.W. 172, 174 (Ky. 1923).
"I~ See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
139 75 S.W.2d at 1065.
-- KRS § 391.140(1) (Baldwin 1984).
141 E.g., Thomas v. Thomas, 398 S.W.2d 231, 232 (Ky. 1965) (land given by mother
to two daughters); Remmele v. Kinstler, 298 S.W.2d 680, 681 (Ky. 1957) (land given by
father to four of his six children); Popplewell v. Flanagan, 244 S.W.2d 445, 447 (Ky.
1951) (land given by father to a son and a daughter); Damron v. Bartley, 194 S.W.2d
73, 74 (Ky. 1946) (land given by parent to child); Williamson v. Phillips, 179 S.W.2d
603, 603 (Ky. 1944) (land given by father to son); Traughber v. King, 32 S.W.2d 8, 10
(Ky. 1930) (land of unequal value given by father to his five children); Pendley v. Lee,
25 S.W.2d 1030, 1030 (Ky. 1930) (land given by father to one of his two daughters);
Ecton v. Flynn, 17 S.W.2d 407, 409 (Ky. 1929) (land given by father to three of his
five children); Cochran v. Simmons, 276 S.W. 989, 990 (Ky. 1925) (land given by father
to one of his three children); Edwards v. Livesay, 261 S.W. 839, 840 (Ky. 1924) (land
of unequal value given by father to his seven children); McCray v. Corn, 182 S.W. 640,
641 (Ky. 1916) (land given by mother to two of her three children); Crafton v. Inge, 98
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money. 142
When an advancement of land is made, the parent or grand-
parent usually has transferred a present possessory fee simple
interest to a descendant. A descendant is still chargeable with
an advancement, however, when the interest given in the land is
merely a present possessory life estate' 43 or a remainder interest
following a life estate.144 On at least one occasion, the descendant
was charged with an advancement when the ancestor gave the
descendant a present, but undivided, fractional interest as a
tenant in common in land. 45 Occasionally, the ancestor transfers
to the descendant not the ownership but the present right to the
rents or use and occupation of the land. 146 The value of the rent
or use and occupation of land is also an advancement. 47
If the parent or grandparent attempted but failed to transfer
ownership of the land, the descendant is not charged with any
advancement. Even if the descendant enjoyed possession of the
land under the invalid conveyance, there has been no advance-
ment equal to the value of that possession. 4 8 According to the
Kentucky courts, in an advancement the donor and the donee
intended respectively to give and to accept ownership of the
land, not merely the use and occupation of the land. Accord-
ingly, to require the donee to account for the value of the use
S.W. 325, 325 (Ky. 1906) (land given by father to only one of his children); Ward v.
Johnson, 97 S.W. 1110, 1110 (Ky. 1906) (land of unequal value given by father to his
ten children); Boblett v. Barlow, 83 S.W. 145, 145 (Ky. 1904) (land given by father to
one of his two children); Nichols v. King, 68 S.W. 133, 133 (Ky. 1902) (land given by
father to three of his nine children); Bowles v. Winchester, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 1, 7 (1877)
(land of unequal value given by will by father to all of his surviving children and
grandchildren).
,,2 E.g., Harlow v. Brand, 148 S.W.2d 690, 690 (Ky. 1941) (mother gave over
S5000 to one of her two sons); Payne v. Auxier, 277 S.W. 298, 298 (Ky. 1925) (father
gave $5000 each to two of his three children); Boblett v. Barlow, 83 S.W. 145, 145 (Ky.
1904) (father gave $2116 to one of his two children).
" 76 Ky. (13 Bush) at 8.
I" Gossage v. Gossage's Adm'r, 136 S.W.2d 775, 776 (Ky. 1940) (life estate reserved
to the donor and the donor's spouse).
'' 97 S.W. at 1110 (father had a one-third interest in fee and a life estate in the
other two-thirds of the land he gave to his daughter).
14, 276 S.W. at 992; Garrott v. Rives, 80 S.W. 519, 520 (Ky. 1904).
1, Isgrigg v. Isgrigg, 200 S.W. 478, 479 (Ky. 1918) (father attempted to orally give
land to his daughter who then occupied it).
"I Id. at 480.
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and occupation of land under an invalid conveyance would be
unjust. Neither party intended the donee to be obligated to pay
rent for the land. If a long period of time elapsed from the
commencement of occupation by the intended donee and the
death of the donor, the value of the use and occupation could
exceed the value of the land itself.149
If the descendant takes possession of the land under an
invalid conveyance which is later perfected by conveyances from
the other intestate takers, the descendant is charged with an
advancement equal to the value of the land.5 0 If the descendant
receives land for less than full value, the excess may be an
advancement.'5 '
Money is the most common subject matter of personal prop-
erty advancements. Because the advancement statute does not
exempt even trivial sums from its definition of advancements, 52
theoretically, the gift of any sum of money is an advancement.
The court in Chism v. Chism,1- 3 however, opined that a
parent should be able to voluntarily assist a child by paying the
child's attorney's fees in a criminal proceeding or by giving the
child a small sum of money without creating either a debt or an
advancement.5 4 Six-hundred dollars was in issue in Chism.'"
Other cases, dealing with allegations of financial advancements
even smaller than in Chism, make no mention of any exception
,49 Id. at 481.
110 Farley v. Stacey, 197 S.W. 636, 641 (Ky. 1917) (mother's void conveyance to
son was later perfected by his siblings' quitclaim deeds to him).
"1 179 S.W.2d at 604 (ancestor's conveyance of land to descendant on which
ancestor had paid part of purchase price was an advancement to that extent); Sevier v.
Bonta, 290 S.W. 683, 684 (Ky. 1927) (ancestor conveyed land worth $6000 to son in
exchange for forgiveness of $3000 debt if father's excess was an advancement); Beatty
v. Beatty's Adm'r, 5 S.W. 771, 772 (Ky. 1887) (ancestor conveyed land to descendant,
retaining a mortgage for less than the value of land); Renaker v. Lafferty's Adm'r, 68
Ky. (5 Bush) 88, 88-89 (1868) (ancestor devised land to descendant subject to charge less
than value of land); Clarke v. Clarke, 56 Ky. (17 B. Mon.) 698, 699 (1856) (ancestor
conveyed land to descendant and remitted purchase price).
,$2 KRS § 391.140(1) ("[a]ny ... money, given or devised by a parent or grand-
parent to a descendant, shall be charged to the descendant .....
-" 176 S.W.2d 101 (Ky. 1943).
Id. at 103.
Id. at 102.
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for small sums of money.Y16 In reality, however, small amounts
of money frequently escape treatment as advancements either
because there is no evidence to establish the transfer or because
the cost of proving the transfer is greater than any increase the
advancement would cause in the shares of the other intestate
takers.
The court in Popplewell v. Flanagan5 7 stated that wedding
gifts of money and personal property to children were not
chargeable as advancements against the children's intestate shares.
This case does not, however, carve out an exception from the
advancement statute for wedding gifts of money. In Popplewell,
each of the children received approximately the same amount in
wedding gifts from the parent. Including the gifts' values in the
hodgepot computation would not have affected the amount each
child was entitled to receive from the parent's intestate estate.
58
The form of a money advancement is not always a direct
payment of money to the intestate taker. In two cases, the
parent's or grandparent's money was used to pay a descendant's
college or professional education costs and the amounts paid
were treated as advancements. 159 In other instances, the dece-
dent's money was used to pay an intestate taker's debt for which
the decedent was the surety'60 or for which the decedent was not
legally obligated to pay.161 In the former case, the debt payment
was an advancement. 162 In the latter instance, it was not found
to be an advancement because the decedent acquired the intestate
taker's note. The court characterized the relationship between
" E.g., Bailey's Adm'r v. Barclay, 60 S.W. 377, 377 (Ky. 1901) ($300 in contro-
versy); 56 Ky. (17 B. Mon.) at 699 ($500 in controversy). But cf. Griggs v. Love, 13
Ky. L. Rptr. 175, 175 (1891) (gift of small diamond ring not an advancement); Ross v.
Dimmit, 3 Ky. L. Rptr. 685, 685 (1882) (gift of bedding as wedding present not an
advancement).
" 244 S.W.2d 445 (Ky. 1951).
Id. at 450.
'-) Weddle v. Waddle's Adm'r, 87 S.W.2d 383, 385 (Ky. 1935) (grandmother's
payment for granddaughter's college expenses held advancement); Hill's Guardian v.
Hill, 92 S.W. 924, 925 (Ky. 1906) (father's payment for son's medical education held
advancement).
" 277 S.W. at 299 (father was surety on daughter's note).
" Oliver v. Crewdson's Adm'r, 77 S.W.2d 20, 21 (Ky. 1934) (mother paid daugh-
ter's note on which the mother's husband was the surety).
"1 277 S.W. at 299.
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the parties after payment of the debt as that of debtor-creditor. 163
The decedent's forgiveness of a debt owed by an intestate taker
would also qualify as an advancement.264
The money expended by a parent or grandparent for the
support and maintenance of a disabled adult child is not consid-
ered an advancement. 65 Similarly, the payment of an adult
child's hospital bill is not an advancement. 66 On the other hand,
the decedent's deposit of money in the intestate taker's bank
account is treated as an advancement. 6 7 Also, the proceeds of
an insurance policy on the parent's life purchased by the parent
and paid to a descendant are an advancement. 6
The cases uniformly demonstrate that the type of property
given by parents or grandparents to descendants is irrelevant in
determining whether an advancement has been made. Tangible
personal property given by a decedent to an intestate taker in
the form of lumber, 69 stock170 or a piano 7' are advancements if
accepted by the intestate taker. 72 A mortgage assigned by a
parent to a child after the parent obtained a judgment on the
mortgage would become an advancement when the child actually
received the money from the judgment debtor. 73 Whether the
gift was made intervivos or by will is also irrelevant. 74 As long
as the decedent died totally or partially intestate, a gift of
01 77 S.W.2d at 22.
'6 Gray v. Gray, 248 S.W. 172 (Ky. 1923) (father forgave debts owed to him by
two sons).
6I Cramin v. Mallone, 113 S.W. 67, 68 (Ky. 1908) (mother cared for disabled adult
son for twenty-four years).
'" 244 S.W.2d at 450 (father paid an adult daughter's $210 hospital bill).
167 Collins v. Collins' Adm'r, 45 S.W.2d 811, 815 (Ky. 1931) (father deposited
money in a bank account in the name of an infant child).
'13 Justice v. Mead, 295 S.W. 976, 976 (Ky. 1927) (insurance proceeds treated as a
satisfaction of a will gift); Thompson v. Latimer, 273 S.W. 65, 67 (Ky. 1925) (proceeds
of insurance policy originally payable to insured's estate were assigned to insured's
children).
161 276 S.W. at 991.
170 194 S.W.2d at 74 (stock held advancement even though valueless on date of
transfer).
171 77 S.W.2d at 22 (daughter never accepted mother's piano).
172 Id.
173 276 S.W. at 991.
174 Walters v. Neafus, 125 S.W. 167, 169 (Ky. 1910) (testator's daughter who
received a remainder interest in one-half of testator's land charged with its value in the
distribution of property not disposed of in will).
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property by a parent or grandparent to a descendant, whenever
made, is an advancement.
1 75
V. PERSONS CHARGEABLE WITH ADVANCEMENTS
Kentucky's advancement statute expressly defines advance-
ments as gratuitous transfers of property from a parent or
grandparent to a descendant.' 7 6 Because advancements cannot be
made to the decedent's ascending or collateral relatives, a dece-
dent's gift to a sibling or parent is never a statutory advance-
ment.177 Similarly, any gift between spouses is not an
advancement.' 78 Therefore, if the decedent's spouse, sibling or
parent receives a gift from the decedent and then shares in the
decedent's intestate estate, the donee need not account for the
gift.
Any gratuitous transfers made to a child by a parent who
died either totally or partially intestate are advancements charge-
able to the child or to those claiming through the child in the
distribution of the parent's intestate property. 179 However, not
all gifts by a grandparent to grandchild are advancements. If
the grandchild's parent survives the grandparent, the grandchild
is not charged with an advancement for a gift received from the
grandparent because the grandchild does not share in the grand-
parent's intestate estate. 80
Even if the grandchild's parent predeceases the grandparent,
the grandchild is only charged with an advancement for gifts
made by the grandparent after the parent's death. In Stevenson
v. Martin,'8' the grandchild's parent was alive when the grand-
parent made the gift to the grandchild. 82 Therefore, the gift was
characterized as a mere gratuity, not an advancement. The court
M" Stiffs Ex'r v. Stiff, 290 S.W. 718, 718 (Ky. 1927); Jones v. Jones' Ex'r, 250
S.W. 92, 94 (Ky. 1923); Owsley v. Owsley, 77 S.W. 394, 397 (Ky. 1903).
--- KRS § 391.140(1).
'1 Id.; Contra UiN. PROBATE CODE § 2-110 (1982) (property given to any heir
treated as advancement if other prerequisites satisfied).
M Talbott's Ex'r v. Goetz, 151 S.W.2d 369, 371 (Ky. 1941) (husband gave wife
S5,000 shortly before his death).
':' KRS § 391.140(1).
" KRS § 391.010(1) (Baldwin 1984).
' ' 74 Ky. (11 Bush) 485 (1875).
, Id. at 491.
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theorized that the gift, when received, was not chargeable to the
grandchild as an advancement because the parent was alive. The
grandchild, therefore, was not then an intestate taker. According
to the court, the subsequent parent's death before the grandpar-
ent did not and could not change the legal consequences of the
transfer to the grandchild.
183
The Stevenson decision is at odds with the statute's policy
of strict financial equality among the decedent's intestate takers
in distribution of the decedents undevised property. 184 If an
ultimate intestate taker received a gift from the decedent, it
should not matter whether the gift was received before or after
the death of someone who would have taken in intestacy if she
or he survived the decedent. Regardless of the timing of the gift,
the grandchild in Stevenson received a larger portion of the
decedent's estate than a similarly situated grandchild who never
received an intervivos gift from the decedent. This decision also
ignores the fact that technically there can be no advancement to
anyone until the donor dies intestate. Until that moment, the
donor has the power to prevent application of the advancement
statute to any intervivos gifts by dying totally testate.
1 85
A descendant who received a gift from a parent or grand-
parent cannot be charged -with an advancement unless the intes-
tate estate being distributed is the donor's estate. For example,
in one case a daughter who received a gift from her father did
not have to account for it because the estate being settled was
her mother's.18 6 In another case, the court reached a seemingly
opposite result. There, even though the mother's estate was being
settled, the child was not charged with a personalty gift received
from the mother because the child's stepfather had consented to
the transfer.18 7 By virtue of the common law doctrine of curtesy
I" Id. at 493.
114 E.g., Popplewell v. Flanagan, 244 S.W.2d 445, 450 (Ky 1951); Gossage v.
Gossage's Adm'r, 136 S.W.2d 775, 777 (Ky. 1940); Weddle v. Waddle's Adm'r, 87
S.W.2d 383, 384 (Ky. 1935); Erdman's Adm'r v. Erdman's Ex'r and Trustee, 16 S.W.2d
756, 757 (Ky. 1929).
Owsley v. Owsley, 77 S.W. 394, 396-97 (Ky. 1903).
" Oliver v. Crewdson's Adm'r, 77 S.W.2d 20, 21 (Ky. 1934). See also Woodward
v. Little, 4 Ky. L. Rptr. 990, 990 (1883) (children could not be charged in settlement of
their mother's estate with proceeds of land given them by their father).
117 Gavin v. Gaines, 5 Ky. L. Rptr. 247 (1883).
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in effect at the time, the mother's personalty belonged to her
husband and the transfer was really a gift by the stepfather. 18
The adoption of the Weissinger Act in 1894189 terminated a
husband's right to acquire title to his wife's personalty upon
marriage. Today, such a transfer by the wife of her personal
property would be treated as an advancement to the daughter
in the settlement of the mother's estate.
In Garrott v. Rives, 190 the decedent's grandchildren, who
were children of a predeceased daughter, were charged with an
advancement because of a conveyance of land to them by their
father. 191 After the death of the decedent's daughter, the grand-
father loaned money to his son-in-law to purchase the land but
later the son-in-law could not repay the loan. To settle the debt,
the grandfather directed the son-in-law to transfer the land to
the children. 192 The land was properly characterized as an ad-
vancement in the settlement of the grandfather's estate because
the land was really a gift from him to the grandchildren. 193
The statute charges those claiming a share in the decedent's
estate through a descendant who received a gift from the dece-
dent with the value of that gift. 94 The obvious application of
this principle is in the settlement of a grandparent's estate. If
the grandchild's parent, a child of the decedent, dies before the
decedent, the grandchild shares in the grandparent's intestate
estate in the place of the predeceased parent. Because the child
is claiming through the parent, 195 the child is charged with any
advancements made by the grandparent to the parent. 196
A less obvious application of this principle occurred in
Veatch's Adm'r v. Loverett'97 in which an intestate taker's cred-
Id. at 247.
1894 Ky. Acts ch. 76, § 37 (current version at KRS § 404.010 (Baldwin 1984)).
80 S.W. 519 (Ky. 1904).
I ld. at 520.
2 d. at 519.
Cf. McGarr v. Taylor's Adm'r, 98 S.W. 1030 (Ky. 1907) (wife given money by
her husband to buy a lot and hold its title in trust for their son did not incur any
obligation to husband's estate to repay the money because money was intended as gift
to son).
IA KRS § 391.140(1).
"' KRS §§ 391.010, 391.040.
Sevier v. Bonta, 290 S.W. 683, 684 (Ky. 1927) (advancement of land to a son
by his father was chargeable to son's children in the settlement of the father's estate).
1,7 97 S.W.2d 47 (Ky. 1936).
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itor was charged with the advancement made to that heir. 19 A
son received an advancement from his father in the form of a
loan he was never required to repay. The father died owning
title to land which vested immediately upon his death in the son
and the other intestate takers, subject to the son's obligation to
account for the advancement he received. Prior to the settlement
of the decedent's estate, a creditor of the son obtained an
attachment and levied upon the son's undivided interest in the
land.199 The court concluded that because a creditor acquires no
better rights in a debtor's property by attachment than the debtor
has, the land attached by this creditor was subject to the son's
advancement obligation. If the son's advancement exceeded the
value of his intestate share of the decedent's estate, the creditor
would have no interest in the land.200 In effect, the son's creditor
was charged with the advancement made to the son.
A person generally is not charged with an advancement for
gifts made by the decedent to the person's own child. 20' The
express language of the advancement statute seems to preclude
any other result because it provides that only gifts actually
received by an intestate taker or a descendant through whom
the intestate taker claims are chargeable as advancements to the
intestate taker. 202 A child of the decedent would neither receive
gifts given to his or her child by the decedent nor claim an
intestate share through the grandchild.
The courts are alert for situations in which parental advance-
ments to a child are disguised as gifts to a grandchild. For
example, in one case 23 a son asked his father to make an
advancement to him by conveying certain land to his infant
child. The reason for the form of the transaction was to prevent
the son's creditors from reaching the land. The deed was not to
be recorded so that when the land was sold, the father could
convey the land with a new deed to the purchaser and the son
could obtain the proceeds of the sale without his creditors'
193 Id. at 50-51.
'9 Id. at 47-48.
m Id. at 50.
201 87 S.W.2d at 383; Stevenson v. Martin, 74 Ky. (11 Bush) 485, 493 (1875).
2 KRS § 391.140(1).
203 Hamilton v. Moore 70 S.W. 402 (Ky. 1902).
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knowledge. The father, however, died before the land was sold.
The court concluded that the son had to account to his father's
estate for an advancement equal to the value of the land con-
veyed to his infant son.
2
0
4
A child may be charged with an advancement for gifts made
to the child's own child in situations other than attempts by the
donor to disguise the true identity of the recipient of the gift.
In Weddle v. Waddle's Adm'r, 205 the grandmother had paid for
her granddaughter's attendance at a music conservatory while
the mother was alive. The court stated a broad rule that if, in
making a gift to a grandchild, the grandparent's intention is to
enable an intestate taker to enjoy presently a part of the estate
the taker was destined to take eventually, the fact that the taker's
child is the immediate beneficiary is irrelevant and the taker is
charged with an advancement. 206 On closer reading, the holding
is much narrower. The mother had agreed that the grandmother
should pay the cost of the granddaughter's schooling as an
advancement against the mother's share of the grandmother's
estate.207 Correctly stated, the holding is that a gift by a grand-
parent to a grandchild is chargeable to the parent as an advance-
ment when the parent consents that the gift is to be paid to the
grandchild on the parent's account.
Although the advancement statute only requires that gifts to
descendants be treated as advancements, in some cases intestate
takers have been required to account for gifts made to their
spouses. If a gift is made by a parent to the child's spouse solely
because the transferee is the spouse of that child, the gift is
treated as an advancement to the child.20 8 If the gift is made to
2- Id. at 402-03. See also Mills' Adm'x v. Mills, 265 S.W.2d 458, 461 (Ky. 1954)
(court indicated in dicta that a conveyance to his infant grandson ought to be treated
as an advancement to the father's son).
87 S.W.2d 383, 384 (Ky. 1935).
Id. at 383-384.
Id. at 384.
: Austin v. Sellars' Adm'r, 261 S.W. 248, 248 (Ky. 1924) (Decedent built and
occupied a house on land owned by her son-in-law to be near daughter. At decedent's
death, son-in-law owned the house.); Barber v. Taylor's Heir, 39 Ky. (9 Dana) 84, 84
(1839) (Father settled daughter and her husband on his land. After daughter died, father
transferred title to son-in-law.). Cf. Duff v. Duff's Ex'r, 142 S.W. 242, 243 (Ky. 1912)
(will provisions established that testator intended a devise of land to a son's children as
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both the child and spouse, the child is charged with an advance-
ment for the whole amount. 209 If, however, the transaction be-
tween the parent and the child's spouse is either a bona fide sale
or creates a bona fide debt, no advancement is charged.
Meyers v. Brown210 illustrates this distinction. In that case,
the father conveyed land to his daughter's husband who executed
notes for the purchase price. When the husband failed to pay
the notes, the father took a reconveyance of the property in
settlement of the debt and cancelled the notes. Although the
daughter had derived some economic benefit from occupying the
land with her husband while the land was in his possession, she
was not charged with the use value of the land as an advance-
ment. The court viewed the original transaction between the
father and son-in-law as the creation, both in form and in fact,
of a debtor-creditor relationship.
21
1
In another similar case, a transaction between a mother and
her son-in-law was characterized as a bona fide sale, and not a
gift chargeable to the daughter as an advancement. 212 A number
of years before the mother's death, she and her son-in-law
entered into an agreement wherein she agreed to build a house
on his land, and he agreed that she could occupy the house for
the rest of her life. There was a distinct agreement between the
mother and her son-in-law supported by adequate consideration.
The mother had the use of the son-in-law's land for her life,
and he received an improvement to his property. Because there
was no gift to the son-in-law, there was nothing to charge to
the daughter as an advancement. 213
From the recipient's perspective, an advancement is a liability
that will be charged to the recipient or those claiming through
the recipient in the settlement of the donor's intestate estate.
advancement to the son); Frye v. Avritt, 68 S.W. 420, 421 (Ky. 1902) (in a will situation
testator intended to charge his daughter an advancement for money he had given her
husband).
2 Pendley v. Lee, 25 S.W.2d 1030, 1032 (Ky. 1930) (husband and wife received
gratuitous land transfer from wife's parents); Crafton v. Inge, 98 S.W. 325, 325 (Ky.
1906) (father conveyed land to daughter and her husband).
210 110 S.W. 402 (Ky. 1908).
211 Id. at 404.
211 261 S.W. at 248-49.
213 Id.
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From the perspective of an intestate taker who did not share in
the decedent's intervivos largesse, however, the advancements
doctrine guarantees a modicum of fairness in the distribution of
the decedent's intestate estate by equalizing the financial treat-
ment of all intestate takers.
An intestate taker not favored with gifts during the dece-
dent's lifetime is not the only one who benefits from the ad-
vancement statute. A grantee of an intestate taker may set up
advancements received by the other intestate takers as a defense
in a lawsuit by the favored intestate taker.
Heath v. Heath2 4 illustrates this point. The father in Heath
gave two large tracts of land to his son and then died owning
only a small tract of land. His heirs were three daughters who
had not received any advancements and the son who had. With-
out securing the agreement of their brother, the daughters pur-
ported to convey the small tract to a third party for valuable
consideration. Eventually, the son's children claimed their fath-
er's interest in that tract. They sought to have the land parti-
tioned and to require an accounting for the rents.21
5
The court permitted the purchaser to raise a defense that the
son's children had no interest in the land because the son had
received advancements in excess of his intestate share of his
father's estate. The court noted that intestate takers who have
received more than their share through advancements are not
entitled to any more of the estate as against other intestate takers
who have not been made the donee's financial equal. The same
principle, the court concluded, should apply to a purchaser for
valuable consideration from the unfavored intestate takers. 216
Application of the advancement statute determines the extent of
the interest the purchaser bought from the unfavored intestate
takers.
Under certain circumstances, the advancement doctrine may
be raised as a defense by a grantee of the decedent. If a descen-
dant who has received an advancement later asserts a claim to
land conveyed by the decedent to a third party, the third party,
214 300 S.W. 343 (Ky. 1927).
21, Id. at 343-44.
21, Id. at 344.
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under certain circumstances, may raise the advancement as a
defense to the descendant's claim. Kentucky Revised Statute
(hereinafter KRS) section 381.160 provides that if a grantor, by
a deed containing a general warranty of title, purports to convey
a greater interest in the land than the grantor actually owns and
there is a claimant who has received an advancement from the
grantor, the claimant is barred from recovering to the extent of
the value of the advancement.
A father gave land to all of his children in Blankenship v.
Haldeman.2 7 As a gratuitous transfer, it qualified as an advance-
ment. Thereafter, the father purported to convey the mineral
rights to a portion of the land to a third party by a deed which
contained a covenant of general warranty.28 The children at-
tacked that transfer, but the court determined that KRS section
381.160 barred their right to assert any claim to the mineral
rights against the purchaser because the value of the land, re-
ceived as an advancement, exceeded the value of the mineral
rights transferred by the deed.
21 9
Justice v. Mead'2 involved another application of KRS sec-
tion 381.160. In that case the husband and wife each owned an
undivided one-half interest in certain land prior to the wife's
death. The wife died, and her one-half interest was inherited by
their only child, subject to the father's rights as the surviving
spouse. Purporting to be the sole owner, the husband conveyed
the land to a third party by a deed containing a covenant of
general warranty. After his father's death, the child received the
proceeds of a life insurance policy which the father had pur-
chased. The court characterized the insurance proceeds as an
advancement within the meaning of KRS section 381.160. Be-
cause the proceeds of the policy exceeded the value of the
undivided one-half interest in the property, the son was estopped
by the statute from asserting a claim to the property.?'
VI. VALUATION OF ADVANCEMENTS
27 10 S.W.2d 469, 469 (Ky. 1928).
218 Id. at 469.
2,9 Id. at 470-71.
295 S.W. 976 (Ky. 1927).
2' Id. at 976.
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A. Present Undivided Interests
An advancement of a present, undivided interest in either
realty or personalty is valued at the time the gift is irrevocably
made.m For example, stock is valued for advancement purposes
when it is transferred to the donee. Any increase in value be-
tween the date of the delivery of the stock and the date of the
donor's death is not part of the value of the advancement.22
When the descendant is the beneficiary of an insurance policy
on the ancestor's life, the proceeds of the policy received by the
descendant are charged as an advancement, not the premiums
paid by the ancestor. This is because the gift is completed only
by the death of the insured.224
Generally, if an advancement is in the form of debt forgive-
ness, the amount of the debt forgiven is the proper measure of
the advancement.22 This was not, however, the measure of value
used in Garrot v. Rives. 2 6 In that case, the decedent's son-in-
law was indebted to the decedent for money borrowed to pur-
chase land. Later, in settlement of this debt, the decedent di-
rected his son-in-law to convey the land to the decedent's
grandchildren.2 7 The value of the land transferred to the grand-
children, not the amount of the forgiven debt, was the proper
measure of the value of the advancement to grandchildren?.
28
Similarly, if a parent or grandparent is indebted to a descendant
and conveys land to the descendant to settle the debt, any excess
value in the land above the amount of the indebtedness is
chargeable to the descendant as an advancement. 2 9
Because real property is valued when the land is irrevocably
given to the donee, the valuation time is usually when the deed
4, E.g., Damron v. Bartley, 194 S.W.2d 73, 74 (Ky. 1946) (stock); Edwards v.
Livesay, 261 S.W. 839, 841 (Ky. 1924) (land); Isgrigg v. Isgrigg, 200 S.W. 478, 479 (Ky.
1918) (land); Farley v. Stacey, 197 S.W. 636, 640 (Ky. 1917) (land); Stevenson v. Martin,
74 Ky. (11 Bush) 485, 488 (1875) (land).
194 S.W.2d at 74 (although stock later rose substantially in value, advancement
held valueless because stock had no value when given to donee).
r4 Thompson v. Latimer, 273 S.W. 65, 67 (Ky. 1925).
2- Garrot v. Rives, 80 S.W. 519, 520 (Ky. 1904).
=6 Id.
z' Id. at 519.
Id. at 520.
- Sevier v. Bonta, 290 S.W. 683, 684 (Ky. 1927) (father conveyed farm valued at
$6000 to a son to whom he only owed $3000).
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is delivered.2 30 In one case, 231 however, the value of a real prop-
erty advancement was determined as of the date the parent and
child entered into a written contract for the transfer, not later
when the deed was delivered. The court reasoned that the date
of the signing of the binding contract was the appropriate time
for fixing the value of the advancement because the donee took
possession of the land on that date. 32
If, at the time of transfer, the land is encumbered by a lien,
the value of the advancement is the value of the property when
conveyed minus the amount of the lien.23 Similarly, if the donor
only paid part of the purchase price for the land and the donee
pays the rest, the value of the advancement is equal to only the
consideration paid by the donor.
2 4
Occasionally, an attempted advancement of land is ineffec-
tive because the donor fails to comply with required formalities
for land conveyances. Frequently the donee has taken possession
before the invalidity of the transfer is realized. In such instances,
the donee is not charged with the value of the use of the land
under the void conveyance. 2 5 The rationale offered for this result
is that the donor and donee intended transfer of title to the land
and not merely the use and occupation of it.236 Charging a donee
with the value of the use and occupation under these circum-
stances is thought to impermissibly create a new object of the
advancement.3 7 Because it defies economic reality, this rationale
is not persuasive. The use of land is something of value. If such
use is unaccounted for in the final settlement of the decedent's
estate, financial equality among the intestate takers, the guiding
principle of Kentucky's advancement statute, can never be
achieved.
m 261 S.W. at 840-41; Ward v. Johnson, 97 S.W. 1110, 1110 (Ky. 1906); Bowles
v. Winchester, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 1, 8 (1877).
23, 74 Ky. (11 Bush) 485.
232 Id. at 489.
23 Weddington v. Adkins, 54 S.W.2d 331, 332 (Ky. 1932) (land worth $450 when
conveyed encumbered by lien. Court held hand was worth at least $200 more than the
lien).
Williamson v. Phillips, 179 S.W.2d 603, 604 (Ky. 1944) (father paid $1,000 of
$1,700 purchase price of land for child).
23 200 S.W. at 479; 97 S.W. at 1111; 76 Ky. (13 Bush) at 13.
2m 200 S.W. at 479.
27 Id. at 480-81.
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As the courts have interpreted the advancement statute, the
donee must account for the value of the use of land only when
the donor intended to give just the use and occupation of the
land.2- 8 If a descendant and spouse occupy land pursuant to a
bona fide sale to the spouse by the descendant's parent or
grandparent, the descendant is not charged with the economic
benefit of the occupancy as an advancement. 2 9 This is the rule
even if the spouse does not fulfill the obligation to pay for the
land, and the decedent takes a reconveyance of the property in
settlement of the debt.240 The indirect economic benefit derived
by the decedent's child through occupancy of the land with the
spouse, while the land was in the spouse's rightful possession,
is not chargeable to the descendant as an advancement. 24'
If a defective gift of land is later perfected by a proper
conveyance, the donee's advancement is valued at the time title
is perfected in the donee, not when the donee earlier commenced
occupancy under the invalid conveyance. 2 2 When a descendant
occupies land under an invalid, but later perfected, gift of title,
or occupies the land under a valid gift of mere use rights,
questions may arise about the proper valuation of the advance-
ment when they make improvements to the land.2 43 Permanent
improvements of land by donees are excluded from the value of
the land or the value of the use and occupancy of the land
chargeable as an advancement. 244 However, it is the enhancement
in vendible value of the land caused by the improvements, and
not the actual cost of the improvement, which is excluded.
24
1
The cost of ordinary repairs to keep the land in the same
2 1 Cochran v. Simmons, 276 S.W. 989, 992 (Ky. 1925) (child received only a right
to use land); McCray v. Corn, 182 S.W. 640, 644 (Ky. 1916) (children cdnveyed like
estate); 80 S.W. at 520 (child occupied land during decedant's life); 76 Ky. (13 Bush) at
7 (father devised life estate to daughter and allowed her to take possession before his
death).
2; Myers v. Brown, 110 S.W. 402, 404 (Ky. 1908).
41 Id.
Id.
261 S.W. at 840; 200 S.W. at 480; 76 Ky. (13 Bush) at 7.
' See 276 S.W. at 992; 182 S.W. at 644; 97 S.W. at 1111.
2" See 276 S.W. 92; 182 S.W. 644; 97 S.W. II11; Clarke v. Clarke, 56 Ky. (17 B.
Mon.) 698 (1856) (donee not charged with any advancement for use of father's land
because donee's improvements were equal to land's rental value).
"1 97 S.W. at 1111. Contra 276 S.W. at 992.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
condition as when occupancy was commenced is not excluded
from the value of the property or of the use and occupancy of
the property, 246 but the payment of the taxes due by the descen-
dant in possession has been deducted from the value of the
advancement chargeable to the descendant.
247
B. Future and Other Divided Interests
When a gift of property is less than a fee simple title,
valuation of an advancement is more difficult. When parents or
grandparents give a descendant a life estate or remainder in
property, the value of the descendant's advancement is only the
present value of the descendant's estate in the property. 248 The
Kentucky court has authorized the use of the Life Expectancy
and Annuity Table249 to compute the present value of a life
estate or a remainder.
250
For example, if a 30 year old descendent was given a life
estate in $100,000 worth of property with the remainder in a
third person, the present value of the property is multiplied by
4% ($100,000 x .04 = $4000) to obtain the annual income
earned by $100,000 invested at 4% interest. The annual income
figure is multiplied by a factor of 19.4028, obtained from the
Life Expectancy and Annuity Table for a 30 year old person.
One is subtracted from the factor to account for the immediate
payment of annual income. The resulting figure ($4000 x 19.4028
= $77,611.20) is the value of the life estate of the 30 year old
descendant in $100,000 worth of property at 4% interest rate.
97 S.W. at 1111.
290 S.W. at 684.
2s 76 Ky. (13 Bush) at 15-17.
24" KRS Tables (Baldwin 1984).
Immediate Annuity
Certain for Total Complete
Expectancy of Life Expectation
Age at 4% of Life
30 20.4028 43.18
250 Morris v. Morris, 293 S.W.2d 243, 245 (Ky. 1956) (used to compute the present
cash value of a surviving spouse's dower right).
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If the value of the life estate is subtracted from the total value
of the property, the difference is the present value of the re-
mainder interest in the property ($100,000 - 77,611.20 =
$22,388.80).
There are problems in using the Life Expectancy and Annuity
Table for computing the present value of life estates or remain-
ders. First, the 4% interest rate fails to accurately reflect today's
market conditions. Second, because the life expectancy figures
are derived from the 1959-61 census, they do not reflect changes
in life expectancy rates during the last twenty-five years. At least
one case intimates that the court will look at factors other than
the theoretical life expectancy of the life tenant and interest rates
when valuing an interest which is less than a present fee simple.
In Ward v. Johnson,2l the court considered the actual life
expectancy of the life tenant. There a father gave his daughter
his own life estate in real property. The daughter, however, was
not charged with an advancement for the value of the life estate
because, in the opinion of the court, her father's ill health made
the gift valueless. 21
The valuation rules are different when the advancement is a
life estate gift to a descendant with the remainder given to the
child or children of the life tenant (D conveys property to C for
life, remainder to C's children). The value of the life estate is
not calculated because the life tenant is charged with the full
present value of the property in fee. 3 The only justification
offered is that this result supposedly fosters the equitable distri-
bution policy of the advancement statuteY 4 It is difficult, how-
ever, to see equity in charging a life tenant with the full value
of the fee merely because the remainder is given the life tenant's
children. Certainly the life tenant in such circumstances has no
greater rights and privileges of ownership than a life tenant
whose estate is followed by the remainder given to a non-
descendent. In either case, the life tenant lacks the fee owner's
power to direct the devolution of the property at death. Never-
2- 97 S.W. 1110 (Ky. 1906).
11 Id. at 1110-11.
2 Gossage v. Gossage's Adm'r, 136 S.W.2d 775, 778 (Ky. 1940); 76 Ky. (13 Bush)
at 15.
=' 76 Ky. (13 Bush) at 19.
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theless, when the remainder is given to the life tenant's issue,
the life tenant must account for the whole value of the fee,2 5
but when the remainder is owned by non-issue, the life tenant's
advancement is the value of just the life estateY
6
When a descendant is given a concurrent ownership interest
in the advancement's subject matter, the descendent is usually
charged with only the value of the fractional interest acquired.
For example, in one case, a parent's gratuitous conveyance to a
child of an undivided one-third fee interest as a tenant in com-
mon was valued at one-third of the value of the fee at the time
of the conveyance.2 7 In the advancement cases involving gratui-
tous conveyances of the fee interest in land to a child and the
child's spouse as concurrent owners, however, the child received
an undivided one-half interest in the land, but was charged with
the full value of the land as an advancement.
25 8
Kentucky's advancement statute specifically provides that an
advancement is "estimated according to the value of the property
when given. ' 259 The statute has been consistently interpreted to
mean that the value of a present interest is determined when the
property is irrevocably given to the donee.260 If the statute re-
quires the same valuation time when the gift is a future interest,
a remainder is valued when created, not when the donee finally
comes into possession of the property. This is the result when
the donor gives a life estate to a third party and the remainder
to a descendant (D conveys property to X for life, remainder to
D's child). The child's advancement is the total value of the
property on the date of transfer minus the value of X's life
estate as computed by the mortality tables.
261
The case law ignores the statutory language when the future
interest to be valued is a remainder given to a descendant fol-
lowing a life estate reserved by the donor (D conveys property
21 136 S.W.2d at 778; 76 Ky. (13 Bush) at 12-13.
2 136 S.W.2d at 778.
27 97 S.W. at 1111.
2 See Pendley v. Lee, 25 S.W.2d 1030, 1032 (1930); Crafton v. Inge, 93 S.W.
325, 326 (1906).
-1 KRS § 391.140(1) (Baldwin 1984).
21 See, e.g., 194 S.W.2d at 74 (personalty); 261 S.W. at 841 (realty).
21 See Popplewell v. Flanagan, 244 S.W.2d 445, 448 (Ky. 1951); 136 S.W.2d at
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to D for life, remainder to D's child). 262 In such instances, the
full value of the property at the death of the donor, D, is
charged to the descendant, D's child. 26 A similar result occurs
when a donor reserves a life estate both for her or himself and
a third person with a remainder to a descendant (D conveys
property to D and D's spouse for life, remainder to D's child).
The descendant, D's child, is charged with an advancement equal
to the value of the property at the time of the donor D's death
minus the value of the third person's life estate at the donor's
death.3 These timing differences in valuing the descendant's
future interest when the donor is the sole or co-life tenant are
inexplicable. Not only does this contradict the express language
of the statute, but two indistinguishable interests are treated
differently. The donee's interest is no different when the life
tenant is the donor or a third party. In either case, the donee
has a remainder which cannot be enjoyed in possession until the
death of the life tenant.
In one case the father conveyed title to land to his child
reserving for himself and his spouse a right to receive a fixed
percentage of the property income for their lives. The value
charged to the child as an advancement was computed by valuing
the father and mother's interest as of the date of the conveyance,
not the date of the father's death, and subtracting their interest
from the value of the land on the date of the conveyance. 265
Even though this early valuation time appears to contradict the
rule for valuation of a future interest following a donor's life
estate, a real difference exists between the nature of this child's
gift and a gift in remainder. The child was given complete title
to the property, including the right to present possession and
enjoyment, subject only to something like an equitable charge
on the land 266 payable to the donor and his spouse. When a
child is given a remainder interest following a life estate in the
,2 See 136 S.W.2d at 778.
: See id.; Hook v. Hook, 52 Ky. (13 B. Mon.) 526, 529-30 (1853).
: - 244 S.W.2d at 449.
' Id. at 448-49.
Property conveyed by an owner who states an intention that the transferee holds
it "subject to a charge" to confer part or all of the capital or income of the property
on another has been held to be subject to an equitable charge. G.G. & G.T. BOERT,
LAW OF TRusTs 28-30 (5th ed. 1973).
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donor or the donor and another, the child has no present interest
in the land and no present right to possess and enjoy it.
C. Evidence of Value
The actual value of advancement property may be established
in a variety of ways. Traditionally, expert testimony from an
appraiser is competent. Other evidence, however, is also admis-
sible. Lay witnesses who live near the land advanced and who
are familiar with the value of real estate in the community are
competent to testify to establish the value of the land.
267
Invalid deeds established the value of land in Cornette v.
McCoy,2 8 where prior to her death, the decedent's children
attempted an invalid oral partition of the decedent's land. Pur-
suant to this invalid agreement, the children executed deeds to
the decedent's land. The deeds were not valid because they were
executed while the decedent was still alive and the children did
not own any interest in the land. When the land later became
the subject matter of an advancement, the values recited in the
invalid deeds were accepted as a basis for determining the value
of the land.
269
In another case, entries in an account book kept by the
donor were found to be 'competent evidence to establish the
amount of money given to the donee.270 Generally, however, the
donor's ability to fix the value of an advancement is limited.27'
This is consistent with the rule that the advancement statute,
not the intention of the donor, controls the question of an
advancement. 272 If a donor's valuation was dispositive, the donor
could easily circumvent the statute's policy of achieving financial
equality among the decedent's intestate takers. By undervaluing
or overvaluing a conveyance, the donor could favor one intestate
taker over another. Consequently, no valuation made by the
donor is conclusive. 273 Because the value of property is within
26 194 S.W.2d at 74.
140 S.W. 683, 683-84 (Ky. 1911).
69 Id.
270 Hill's Guardian v. Hill, 92 S.W. 924, 925 (Ky. 1906).
271 See id.; 76 Ky. (13 Bush) at 18.
272 76 Ky. (13 Bush) at 19.
271 97 S.W. at 1111.
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the personal knowledge of the donor, however, the donor's
valuation can be considered along with other evidence to deter-
mine the actual value of the property. 274 The value of an ad-
vancement is a question for the trier of fact and the trier's
finding will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly contrary
to the weight of the evidence.2 75
The only method by which a donor can control whether an
advancement has or has not been made and the value of given
advancements is for the donor to die testate. In total testacy the
will provisions regulate whether an advancement has been made
276
and the value of any advancement.
277
D. Interest
Because only gifts qualify as advancements under Kentucky's
advancement statute, an advancement does not create any obli-
gation to repay the donor's estate. 278 Charging a donee with
interest on an advancement is inconsistent with this gift theory.
With only a few exceptions, the case law reflects that an ad-
vancement is a gift, not a loan with interest chargeable to the
donee.
279
The few cases that do permit interest to be assessed against
recipients of advancements rest on the ground that interest pro-
motes greater equality among intestate takers.20 In one case, the
7, See Boblett v. Barlow, 83 S.W. 145, 146 (Ky. 1904); 76 Ky. (13 Bush) at 16-17.
17 194 S.W.2d at 74.
See Sullivan v. Sullivan, 92 S.W. 966, 967 (Ky. 1906).
27 Montgomery's Trustee v. Brown, 121 S.W. 472, 475 (Ky. 1909); 97 S.W. at
1111.
2. See Farmers' Exch. Bank of Millersburg v. Moffett, 75 S.W.2d 1063, 1065 (Ky.
1934); Gibbs v. Gibbs, 72 S.W.2d 473, 474 (Ky. 1934); McPherson v. Black, 284 S.W.
413, 414-15 (Ky. 1926); 261 S.W. at 840.
r,' See, e.g., Royse v. Royse, 34 S.W. 1068, 1069 (Ky. 1896) (issue of interest on
an advancement raised but not decided); Metcalfe v. Stubbs, 3 Ky. Op. 338, 340 (1869)
(expressly refused to permit the charging of interest on an advancement).
2', Cline v. Cline, 284 S.W. 1110, 1111 (Ky. 1926) (court charged descendents
interest on transfers fraudulently obtained from decedent from date of conveyances to
date conveyances were set aside and charged interest on nonfraudulently obtained trans-
fers from date of donor's death until time estate distributed); Payne v. Auxier, 277 S.W.
298, 299 (Ky. 1925) (interest charged on excess of advancement over descendant's
intestate share from date of incomplete original distribution of decedent's estate until
final distribution of estate).
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intestate takers who were not given advancements were awarded
money from the decedent's intestate property equal to interest
charged on the excess of an advancement over the intestate
shares .281 The interest was computed from the date of the orig-
inal, but incomplete, distribution of the decedent's intestate es-
tate to the final distribution some twenty-five years later. In the
original distribution there was not enough property to equalize
the shares of those intestate takers who received advancements
with those who did not. In the original distribution, the donee's
advancement exceeded the individual shares of the other intestate
takers by approximately $1500. Because the donee enjoyed a full
share of the decedent's estate for almost twenty-five years prior
to the final settlement while the other intestate takers did not,
the court determined that it was equitable and just to award an
amount of money to the other intestate takers equivalent to
interest on $1500 for the time period the final distribution was
postponed. 2 2 Although the result seems equitable, it is incon-
sistent with the overwhelming number of advancement decisions
that do not hold donees of advancements accountable for interest
on the advancement.
283
With a will, the testator's intention is controlling.2 4 The
testator can affirmatively make a will beneficiary accountable
for intervivos gifts as advancements and instruct the executor to
charge interest on such gratuitous transfers. 25 Testamentary di-
rections to charge a donee with interest on an advancement are
given effect by computing interest from the date of the intervivos
advancement and subtracting that amount from any amount
payable to the donee under the terms of the will.
286
VII. AN EXCEPTION: MAINTAINING, EDUCATING OR GIVING
MONEY WITHOUT A VIEW TO A PORTION IN LIFE
Only one exception exists to Kentucky's statutory mandate
that property given or devised by a parent or a grandparent to
21, 277 S.W. at 299.
282 Id.
211 See note 279 supra.
11 See notes 276-77 supra.
"I Fisk v. Carpenter, 242 S.W. 30, 31 (Ky. 1922).
236 Id.
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a descendant must be charged to the descendant in the division
and distribution of the donor's undevised estate. The exception
embodied in the statute provides that "[t]he maintaining or
educating or the giving of money, to a child or grandchild,
without any view to a portion or settlement in life, shall not be
deemed an advancement." 2 Case law examples of transactions
within the exception are not numerous, but they are diverse. For
example, a parent's payment of attorney's fees incurred by an
adult child in a criminal proceeding was found to fall within the
exception 2ls as was the payment of the cost of a trip to Europe
for two children of another parent.
289
The statutory language "without any view to a portion or a
settlement in life' 290 seems to require consideration of the do-
nor's intention. The case law, however, emphatically rejects the
idea that the donor's intention controls the determination of
whether an expenditure to a child was made with a "view to a
portion". 2 9' Instead, the case law articulates an objective test
holding that if the parental expenditure is for the health, edu-
cation, maintenance, amusement or other temporary pleasure of
the child, it is not made with a "view to a portion" in life.
292
If the gift is made for investment in property or for other
permanently enjoyable uses, it is an advancement. 293 The type
and size of the donor's estate and the gift's amount are relevant
to determine whether expenditures are temporary or perma-
nent. 2
94
Maintenance of a child usually falls within the statutory
exception because the support of an infant child is a parental
obligation running to all of the parent's children. Thus, the
equality in distribution policy of the advancement statute is not
jeopardized by recognizing the fulfillment of this obligation as
KRS § 394.140(1) (Baldwin 1984).
2 Chism v. Chism, 176 S.W.2d 101, 103 (Ky. 1943).
, Bowles v. Winchester, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 1, 17-18 (1877).
2, KRS § 394.140(1).
See note 270 supra.
22 Hill's Guardian v. Hill, 92 S.W. 924, 925 (Ky. 1906); 76 Ky. (13 Bush) at 19;
Clarke v. Clarke, 56 Ky. (17 B. Mon.) 698, 706-07 (1856).
2' See note 292 supra.
See 92 S.W. at 925-26; 76 Ky. (13 Bush) at 15.
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an exception. 2 5 No legal duty is imposed on a parent to support
an adult child, but the discharge of a parent's moral obligation
to support a disabled adult child should also be within the
statutory exception. 296 However, if an adult child suffers no
mental or physical impediments to self sufficiency but is gratui-
tously supported and maintained by a parent, the value of that
support ought to be treated as an advancement. It is analogous
to holding a child accountable for the value of the use of land
when a parent permits a child to occupy the land gratuitously.
297
Similarly, while parental expenditures for a child's profes-
sional school training are treated as advancements, providing an
ordinary education to a child is not. 2 8 The court reasoned in
Hill's Guardian v. Hill'99 that the father's payment of his son's
medical school education was an advancement because the father
entered each expenditure into an account book. According to
the court, the periodic entries evidenced the father's intention
that the money was provided with a view to a portion or settle-
ment in life. 3 ° The result is correct, but the reliance on the
account book to establish whether the transaction was within or
without the exception to the advancement statute was wrong.
The intention of the donor is irrelevant in determining whether
the expenditure is or is not an advancement. When a parent
provides a child with a typical or ordinary amount of education,
the parent is merely fulfilling a parental obligation owing to all
of the children. That is not true when the parent provides an
adult child with a professional school education. The child has
been given something just as permanent and lasting in value as
a child who is given a piece of land by a parent and should be
likewise held accountable for its value.
295 See 92 S.W. at 925-26.
Il Cf. Crain v. Mallone, 113 S.W. 67, 68-69 (Ky. 1908) (Without specifically
referring to the exception to the advancement statute, the cost of maintaining a disabled
adult child was not treated as an advancement.).
297 See, e.g., Cochran v. Simmons, 276 S.W. 989, 992 (Ky. 1925); McCray v. Corn,
182 S.W. 640, 643-44 (Ky. 1916).
21 See 92 S.W. at 925-26. Cf. Brannock v. Hamilton, 72 Ky. (9 Bush) 446, 448-49
(1872) (money paid by grandfather for granddaughter's ordinary education not an
advancement, but court's rationale was incorrect because the child's mother was the one
against whom the money was sought to be charged).
92 S.W. 924 (Ky. 1906).
Id. at 925-26.
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Without the statutory exception, the advancement statute
would deprive parents of the ability to give a child even a small
gift of money for amusement or pleasure without the child being
accountable for the money as an advancement. The exception,
however, is not intended to be a means by which parents can
excuse children from having to account for gifts of significant
and permanent value. This temporary/permanent enjoyment di-
chotomy, as applied in Clarke v. Clarke0 1 convinced the court
that the father's $500 gift to his son was not within the excep-
tion.302 When applied in Bowles v. Winchester,0 3 however, the
court concluded that $15,000 expended by the parent on two
children was not an advancement. 304 In Clarke, the father had
conveyed land to his son for consideration of $2100.305 After the
sale, the father returned $500 of the purchase price to his son.
Although the amount of money was not large, the transaction
was treated as the equivalent of giving the son $500 worth of
real property. Therefore, because the money was for permanent,
not temporary, pleasure it was treated as an advancement. In
Bowles, the money was expended to pay for a one-year tour of
Europe.c0 Although the amount of money was sizable for the
time period, it was small in relationship to the substantial wealth
of the parent. Consequently, the court treated the gift as one
for the temporary, not permanent, amusement and pleasure of
the two children and they did not have to account for the money
in the final settlement of their parent's estate.
30 7
VIII. A PROPOSAL FOR STATUTORY REFORM
The foregoing discussion of Kentucky's case law on advance-
ments demonstrates a number of serious problems with Kentuc-
ky's current advancement statute. The following statute is
proposed as a solution to the problems currently associated with
the advancement doctrine in Kentucky. It is modeled on the
56 Ky. (17 B. Mon.) 698 (1856).
* Id. at 709.
76 Ky. (13 Bush) 1 (1877).
. Id. at 17-20.
56 Ky. (17 B. Mon.) at 704.
76 Ky. (13 Bush) at 17.
- Id. at 19-20.
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advancement statute contained in the Uniform Probate Code"°
but modified because a surviving spouse in Kentucky receives a
dower share rather than an intestate share as provided under the
Uniform Probate Code.
3 9
(1) Any intervivos gift of real or personal property made
to an intestate taker by a decedent who dies totally intestate
shall be charged to the intestate taker as an advancement
against the recipient's share of the estate only if declared to
be an advancement in a contemporaneous writing signed by
the decedent or acknowledged to be an advancement in writing
by the recipient. If the recipient does not survive the decedent,
the property given is not charged as an advancement against
the intestate share of the decedent's estate taken by the recip-
ient's issue unless the declaration or acknowledgment provides
otherwise.
One critical problem with Kentucky's advancement statute is
its application to the estates of decedents who never intended
the doctrine to apply to a recipient of their intervivos or testa-
mentary largesse. Currently, the only way such donors can pre-
vent application of the advancement doctrine is to die totally
testate.3 10 The application of the doctrine to the estate of any
decedent who has not expressly manifested an intention that the
doctrine ought to apply is based on an erroneous assumption
that decedents want equality among their intestate takers. Do-
nors rarely intend to make recipients accountable for the value
of small gifts. Larger and more valuable intervivos gifts favoring
some intestate takers over others more likely result from a do-
nor's knowing decision to favor the recipient at the expense of
other intestate takers than from a decision to make a gift which
is later charged to the recipient to equalize the shares of all
intestate takers.
The proposed statute is based on the opposite presumption
that most donors do not intend intervivos gifts to be advance-
ments against the donee's intestate share of the donor's estate.
"' UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-110 (1982).
Id. at § 2-102; KRS § 392.020 (Baldwin 1984).
110 See Remmele v. Kinstler, 298 S.W.2d 680, 681-82 (Ky. 1957) (conveyance treated
as advancement contrary to grantor's intent because grantor died intestate).
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Decedents may still make advancements under this proposed
statute, but a donor's intention that the intervivos gift be held
an advancement must be demonstrated by written evidence be-
fore a donee can be charged with the value of the gift. In
addition to this statutorily prescribed method, donors would
continue to have the power to charge donees with the value of
advancements by appropriate provisions in their wills.
311
Just as it is wrong to presume that donors intend intervivos
gifts to potential intestate takers to be advancements, it is er-
roneous to presume that decedents want intervivos gifts charged
to children of donees if the donees do not survive the decedents.
Therefore, the proposed statute requires written evidence of the
donor's intention to charge the child of a donee with the donee's
advancement. Without written evidence of such donor intention,
a gift which would be chargeable against the recipient as an
advancement if the recipient survived the donor is not charged
against the recipient's child even if the recipient does not survive
the donor and the donee's child shares in the donor's intestate
estate.
The unexpected consequences caused by application of Ken-
tucky's current advancement statute are only worsened by the
statute's application to cases of partial as well as total intestacy.
Not only are intervivos gifts that were never intended to be taken
into account in the final settlement of the decedent's estate
charged against the donee, 31 2 but will gifts are deducted from
the beneficiary's share of the testator's undisposed of intestate
property.
13
The proposed statute restricts the advancement concept to
situations of total intestacy. When decedents die partially testate,
they must expressly provide in their wills that a will beneficiary
is to account for any will gifts in the distribution of the dece-
dent's intestate property. This is in keeping with the entire thrust
of the proposed statutory changes that no one should be charged
with an advancement unless there is an unambiguous, written
manifestation of the donor's intention to so charge the donee.
"M See Jones v. Jones' Ex'rs, 250 S.W. 92, 94-95 (Ky. 1923); Gulley v. Lillard's
Ex'r, 141 S.W. 58, 59 (Ky. 1911).
312 See, e.g., Ecton v. Flynn, 17 S.W.2d 407, 410 (Ky. 1929).
M See, e.g., Walters v. Neafus, 125 S.W. 167, 169-70 (Ky. 1910).
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This portion of the proposed statutory revision of Kentucky's
advancement statute also eliminates a basic inconsistency em-
bodied in Kentucky's present advancement statute. Currently,
the advancement statute treats only intervivos gifts from parents
and grandparents to a descendant as advancements when those
descendants are intestate takers of the donor.31 4 If the class of
intestate takers includes only ancestors or collateral relatives of
the decedent, the advancement concept is inapplicable even if
some members of the class have received intervivos gifts from
the decedent and others have not. If the pursuit of equality
among intestate takers is a legitimate and important concern
when the intestate takers are descendants of the decedent, it is
an equally legitimate and important concern when the intestate
takers are collateral relatives or ancestors. Under the proposed
statute, the decedent is given the power to hold any intestate
taker accountable for the value of an intervivos gift if that
intention is expressed in an appropriate writing.
The requirement of written evidence of the donor's intention
to charge the donee of an intervivos gift with an advancement
will help to decrease the amount of advancement litigation. The
current statute stimulates litigation over the nature of various
parent-child and grandparent-grandchild transfers,315 the ade-
quacy of the consideration for such transfers, 316 and the truth-
fulness of documents such as deeds or notes evidencing the
transfers. 317 The present statutory exception which permits a
parent or grandparent to maintain, educate, or give money to a
descendant without a view to a portion or settlement 38 also
creates opportunities for litigation. Whether a particular expend-
iture falls within the statutory exception is a question of fact
which must be determined on a case-by-case basis. Similarly, the
temporary/permanent pleasure test for determining whether a
gift of money was made with or without a view to a portion or
settlement in life must be addressed in the same case-by-case
manner. 3 9 The proposed statute eliminates the potential for this
31, KRS § 391.140(1) (Baldwin 1984).
315 See text accompanying notes 70-139 supra.
316 Id.
317 Id.
318 KRS § 391.140(1).
319 See notes 291-307 supra and accompanying text.
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type of litigation by requiring written evidence of the donor's
intention to create an advancement with the intervivos gift she
or he made to the donee. Only challenges to the validity of the
writing based on allegations of forgery, fraud, undue influence
or mistake would be brought to the courts.
(2) An advancement is valued at the earlier of the time the
intestate taker came into possession or enjoyment of the prop-
erty or the decedent's death. Only the value of the donee's
actual interest or estate in the property at the time set for
valuation is charged to the donee as an advancement.
Kentucky's case law has developed a number of unfair dis-
tinctions in the timing and method of valuing certain kinds of
advancements. For example, a child who is given a life estate
with a remainder in a third person is charged with only the value
of the life estate. 320 The same child is charged with the whole
value of the property given if the remainder is given to that
child's children.32' A similar anomaly arises when the child is
given a remainder following a life estate in certain property. If
the remainder follows a life estate in a third person, the value
of the child's remainder interest is determined at the creation of
the interests by subtracting the value of the stranger's life estate
from the fair market value of the property.322 If the child's
remainder interest follows a life estate created in favor of the
donor, the child is charged with the full value of the property
at the death of the donor when she or he finally has the present
right to possess the property.
32
Under the proposed valuation rule, any present possessory
estate or interest given is valued as of the time the estate or
interest was created. Any future interest given is valued when
the donee first has the right to possess or enjoy the property or
at the time of the donor's death, whichever occurs first. Val-
uation of a future interest can not be postponed beyond the
donor's death because of the need to complete administration
of the donor's estate. Until the value of an advancement is
Gossage v. Gossage Adm'r, 136 S.W.2d 775, 778 (Ky. 1940).
Id.; Bowles v. Winchester, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 1, 12-13 (1877).
1,2 See note 261 supra.
- See note 263 supra.
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determined, the intestate share of the donee and the other intes-
tate takers cannot be ascertained. When the time for valuation
occurs, the donee cannot be charged with more than the value
of the actual interest or estate the donee then owns. If, at the
time for valuation, the donee owns only a present possessory
life estate, the donee is charged with only the value of the life
estate regardless of the identity of the future interest holders.
Similarly, if, at the donor's death, the donee owns a remainder
interest which is not made possessory by the donor's death, the
donee is only charged with the value of that future interest and
not with the whole value of the fee simple.
(3) Advancements shall not be considered part of the de-
cedent's personal estate in estimating the distributable share of
the surviving spouse.
This last section is necessary because in Kentucky the surviv-
ing spouse is not an intestate taker of the decedent unless the
decedent dies without any issue, parents, siblings or the issue of
siblings surviving. 314 Instead, the surviving spouse is entitled to
one half of the surplus personalty the decedent died owning,
one-half of the surplus realty the decedent died owning and a
life estate in one-third of any real property the decedent con-
veyed away during marriage without the release of the dower.
3
2
5
If advancements are taken into account in determining the sur-
viving spouse's distributable share, the spouse would be entitled
to a proportionately larger share of the intestate property. Be-
cause the donee of an advancement is not required to actually
surrender to the donor's estate any excess advancement over the
donee's intestate share, the spouse would be entitled to this larger
share at the expense of any intestate taker who did not receive
advancements.
For example, assume the decedent, owning $40,000 in surplus
personalty, died survived by a spouse and two children. Also,
assume that one of the children received an advancement of
$20,000 from the decedent. If the advancement is added into the
'2 KRS § 391.010(4) (Baldwin 1984).
121 KRS § 392.020.
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decedent's estate for the purpose of calculating the spouse's
share, the surviving spouse is entitled to $30,000 in personalty
(1/2 of $60,000). With the advancement included, the children
are entitled to share equally in the remaining $30,000 receiving
$15,000 a piece. Although the donee of the $20,000 advancement
would not be entitled to receive anything more from the estate,
that child would not have to contribute the $5,000 excess over
her or his intestate share to the decedent's estate. Thus, there
would only be $40,000 in personalty to distribute. The surviving
spouse would be entitled to $30,000 and the child who did not
receive an advancement would only receive $10,000 from the
decedent's intestate personalty.
If, however, the $20,000 advancement is excluded from the
calculation of the surviving spouse's distributable share as di-
rected by the proposed statute, the spouse would be entitled to
only $20,000 from the decedent's personalty (1/2 of $40,000).
The remaining $20,000 of surplus personalty will be distributed
solely to the child who did not receive an advancement because
the child who received the advancement received more than her
or his intestate share of $10,000 (1/2 of $20,000). This result is
fairer because the child who did not receive the advancement is
not penalized by receiving the smaller intestate share which
results from including the advancement.
The surviving spouse continues to be protected against fraud-
ulent transfers made by the decedent spouse. Any transaction
which is a fraud on the surviving spouse's marital share may be
set aside to the extent necessary to protect the surviving spouse's
rights. A transfer is a fraud on the marital share if it is not
made in good faith or if it is unreasonable in amount. 32 6 Thus,
even a transfer to an intestate taker in the form of an advance-
ment is attackable as a fraud on the marital share of the surviv-
ing spouse. The proposed advancement statute would not
eliminate this protection for the surviving spouse.
The proposed changes in Kentucky's advancement statute
would result in a statute that is fairer in result than the present
"' See Rudd v. Rudd, 214 S.W. 791, 793-94 (Ky. 1919). See also Murray v. Murray,
13 S.W. 244, 245-46 (Ky. 1890).
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statute and more likely to effectuate the average donor's intent.
No longer would there be a danger that a birthday, graduation
or other present will be used later to decrease the intestate share
of a child of the donor. Children who are rewarded by a parent
for fulfilling their filial duties would no longer see that reward
set off against their shares of the parent's intestate estate. Yet,
donors who truly intend to advance a child part of their inher-
itance can accomplish that result by simply evidencing that in-
tention in writing.
CONCLUSION
Kentucky's advancement statute works injustices in a number
of ways. Gifts never intended as advancements are charged
against the recipient's intestate share. Descendants are charged
with advancements but collateral heirs receiving the same gifts
are not charged. The courts characterize transactions between
the decedent and descendants of the decedent as sales, debts or
advancements without reference to the decedent's intention. The
valuations rules are based on distinctions which are based on
differences in form, but not differences in fact. Kentucky's
highest court has recognized that Kentucky's advancement doc-
trine works injustices, but the court believes that the fault lies
in the statutory language, not in its interpretation of the ad-
vancement statute.
This article proposes changing Kentucky's advancement stat-
ute to end its unfairness and arbitrariness. The decendent's
intention is dispositive of whether an advancement has been
made. However, the intention to make an advancement must be
expressed in writing. A consistent rule for valuing advancements
is proposed. Only the actual interest of the donee is valued and
it is valued only at a clearly specified time. Finally, the proposed
statute calculates the surviving spouse's share of the decedent's
estate without reference to any advancements made by the de-
cedent. This precludes unfairness to those intestate takers who
did not receive an advancement. Passage of this proposed statute
will result in an advancement statute which is clearer, fairer and
easier to apply.
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